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As a result of movements for labeling food with genetically modified organisms 
(GMOs), Congress enacted a mandatory labeling requirement in 2016. These 
movements, and the legislation, raise recurring questions about mandatory product 
labels: whether there is a market failure, neoclassical or behavioral, that justifies 
them, and whether the benefits of such labels justify the costs. The first goal of this 
Article is to identify and to evaluate the four competing approaches that agencies now 
use to assess the costs and benefits of mandatory labeling in general. The second goal 
is to apply those approaches to the context of genetically modified (GM) food. 
Assessment of the benefits of mandatory labels presents especially serious challenges. 
Agencies have (1) claimed that quantification is essentially impossible; (2) engaged in 
breakeven analysis; (3) projected various endpoints, such as health benefits or purely 
economic savings; and (4) relied on private willingness-to-pay for the relevant information. 
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All of these approaches run into serious normative and empirical challenges. In principle, 
(4) is best, but in practice, (2) is sometimes both the most that can be expected and the 
least that can be demanded. 
Many people favor labeling GM food on the ground that it poses serious risks to 
human health and the environment, but with certain qualifications, the prevailing 
scientific judgment is that it does no such thing. In the face of that judgment, some 
people respond that even in the absence of evidence of harm, people have “a right to 
know” about the contents of what they are eating. A simple response to this argument 
is that the benefits of such labels might well be lower than the costs. Consumers would 
obtain no health benefits from labels. To the extent that they would be willing to pay 
for them, the reason (for many though not all) is likely to be erroneous beliefs about 
health risks, and erroneous beliefs are not a sufficient justification for mandatory labels. 
Moreover, GMO labels might well lead people to think that the relevant foods are 
harmful and thus affirmatively mislead them. 
Some people contend that GMOs pose risks to the environment (including 
biodiversity), to intelligible moral commitments, or to nonquantifiable values. Other 
people think that the key issue involves the need to take precautions in the face of 
scientific uncertainty: because there is a non-zero risk that GM food will cause 
irreversible and catastrophic harm, it is appropriate to be precautionary, through 
labels or through more severe restrictions. The force of this response depends on the 
science: If there is a small or uncertain risk of serious harm, precautions may indeed 
be justified. If the risk is essentially zero, as many scientists have concluded, then 
precautions are difficult to defend. The discussion, though focused on GM foods, has 
implications for disclosure policies in general, which often raise difficult questions 
about hard-to-quantify benefits, the proper use of cost–benefit balancing in the face 
of uncertainty, and the appropriate role of precautionary thinking. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When should government mandate labels? When would mandatory labels 
have desirable consequences for social welfare? How can those consequences 
be measured? When would labels do more good than harm? 
Under Executive Order 12866, binding on federal executive agencies, 
some kind of market failure is ordinarily required to justify regulation, 
including mandatory labels (either a standard, neoclassical market failure or 
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a behavioral market failure).1 And even in the presence of a market failure, 
Executive Order 12866 allows regulation, including mandatory labels, to be 
imposed only if the benefits justify the costs2—an issue that presents unusual 
challenges in light of the immense and pervasive difficulty of quantifying 
both the benefits and the costs of labels.3 
My principal goal here is to attempt to show how agencies can make 
progress in surmounting that difficulty, and thus to offer a guide suitable for 
use in many contexts, including (for example) calorie labels, energy efficiency 
labels, fuel economy labels, graphic warnings, and much more. Sometimes 
agencies can quantify both benefits and costs, or at least significant subsets of 
them, either by using endpoints (economic savings or health benefits) or by 
measuring private willingness-to-pay for labels. Sometimes they can point to 
human dignity, equity, or distributional concerns.4 Sometimes they can 
engage in “breakeven analysis.” As we will see, private willingness-to-pay is 
the best approach in theory, but measuring it raises serious empirical and 
conceptual challenges. 
To anchor the discussion, I focus in particular on mandatory labels for 
food that contains genetically modified organisms (GMOs), because the topic 
has become significant in light of recent legislation,5 and because it raises a 
number of general puzzles from which broader lessons can be drawn. In 
Europe, and increasingly in the United States, there is considerable public 
concern about GMOs and about food that contains them (GM food).6 As a 
 
1 See Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 1, 3 C.F.R. § 638 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 86-91 
(2012) (directing federal agencies to “promulgate only such regulations as . . . are made necessary by 
compelling public need, such as material failures of private markets”). 
2 See id. § 1(b)(6) (requiring agencies to “adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination 
that the benefits of the intended regulation justify its costs”). 
3 See infra Section I.B. 
4 See Exec. Order No. 12,866, § (1)(a) (noting that the benefits to be considered “includ[e] . . . 
distributive impacts; and equity”). 
5 National Bioengineered Food Disclosure Standard, Pub. L. No. 114-216, 130 Stat. 834 (2016) 
(to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 1639, 1639 to 1639c). Note that the requirement allows considerable 
flexibility for the regulated class, and the flexibility should significantly reduce compliance costs: 
food producers can comply with a symbol or with text, but also with a barcode that consumers can 
scan to obtain information on ingredients. See id. § 293 (allowing food manufacturers the choice of 
using either “text, symbol, or electronic or digital link”). 
6 See, e.g., Ben Popken, Obama Signs Controversial GMO Food Label Law, NBCNEWS (Aug. 1, 
2016, 9:51 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/business/consumer/obama-signs-controversial-gmo-food
-label-law-n620796 [https://perma.cc/C6PS-VZ3C] (reporting that advocates of the GMO labeling 
law believe “consumers want to know exactly what’s in their food”). For a discussion on movements 
in Congress, see Dan Flynn, Just Label It Takes a Victory Lap After Losing; Opts to Move On, FOOD 
SAFETY NEWS (July 10, 2016), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2016/07/128725/#.V4I0pc5i5FJ [https://
perma.cc/MZ4B-HRMU], which reports on the development of the GMO labeling bill. For a discussion 
of various related issues, see Margaret Rosso Grossman, European Community Legislation for Traceability 
and Labeling of Genetically Modified Crops, Food, and Feed, in LABELING GENETICALLY MODIFIED 
FOOD: THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND LEGAL DEBATE 32 (Paul Weirich ed., 2007) [hereinafter 
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matter of science, the principal claims are that GM food poses, or might pose, 
public health risks, and that GMOs endanger, or might endanger, the 
environment.7 (As we shall see, there are other claims as well.) In response to 
these claims, the most modest proposal is that GM food should be labeled as 
such, so that consumers can know what they are buying.8 In its simplest and 
most intuitive form, the argument is that people have a right to know the 
ingredients of their food, at least when they fear that those ingredients pose 
risks to health or the environment. 
In 2016, Congress embraced that argument, enacting legislation to require 
labeling of GM food.9 The new legislation directs the Secretary of Agriculture 
to promulgate implementing regulations within two years.10 Under existing 
Executive Orders, those regulations will have to be accompanied by some 
kind of formal cost–benefit analysis.11 
The seemingly modest arguments in favor of mandatory labels for GM 
food raise fundamental questions about product labeling in general. For GM 
food in particular, a market failure is not simple to demonstrate, and it is even 
more challenging to show that the benefits of labels justify the costs. The first 
reason is that GM foods do not pose health risks at all,12 and the standard (though 
hardly uncontested) reading of the science appears to be that the environmental 
risks are somewhere between nonexistent and highly speculative.13 To that extent, 
GM labels might confer no tangible benefits on consumers. The second reason 
is that GM labels may affirmatively mislead some or many consumers by leading 
them to believe, falsely, that the government thinks that GM foods do pose risks 
to health or the environment.14 Because it is not easy to show that the benefits 
 
LABELING GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOOD], which provides an introduction to the labeling practices 
of different European countries and their justifications. 
7 For an instructive discussion, see ALAN MCHUGHEN, PANDORA’S PICNIC BASKET: THE 
POTENTIAL AND HAZARDS OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS (2000). 
8 See Peter Markie, Mandatory Genetic Engineering Labels and Consumer Autonomy, in LABELING 
GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOOD, supra note 6, at 88, 88 (outlining the “autonomy” argument, which 
calls for GM labels so that consumers can “make purchase decisions that are informed by their values”). 
9 National Bioengineered Food Disclosure Standard §§ 291–96. 
10 See id. § 293(a) (requiring the Secretary to establish regulations “[n]ot later than 2 years 
after the date of enactment”). 
11 See Exec. Order No. 13,563, § 1, 3 C.F.R. 215 (2011), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 102-
02 (2012) (specifying that an “agency must . . . propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned 
determination that its benefits justify its costs”). 
12 See Popken, supra note 6 (“A recent review of two decades of research and over 900 studies 
by the National Academy of Science has not found any evidence that genetically modified organisms 
pose a hazard to human health.”). 
13 See infra notes 115–21 and accompanying text. 
14 See Oren Bar-Gill et al., Drawing False Inferences from Mandated Disclosures 2 (Feb. 9, 2017) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers2.cfm?abstract_id=2914354 [https://perma.
cc/NX9T-9LZU] (“[C]onsumers may hear “DANGER!” even though the government does not mean 
to issue a “DANGER!” warning at all.”); Juanjuan Zhang, Policy and Inference: The Case of Product 
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of mandatory GM labels would justify the costs, there is a strong argument that 
such labels would run into serious difficulty during the process of scrutiny 
undertaken by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs under 
Executive Orders 12866 and 13563,15 and may potentially face legal objections.16 
On welfare grounds, a tempting argument for GM labels is straightforward: 
Many consumers want them, and they would be willing to pay something in 
return for them. Labeling is required because people demand it; in surveys, the 
overwhelming majority of Americans do favor mandatory labels.17 But this 
argument runs into two objections. The first is the fact that the market is not, 
on its own, producing such labels. This objection is not fatal in light of 
potential market failures, behavioral and otherwise, but it does raise questions 
about the basic claim. People’s responses to survey questions may not reflect 
what they really care about, as reflected in their general lack of interest in the 
topic at the grocery store or in restaurants.18 
The second and more fundamental objection is that the consumer demand 
for labels (to the extent that it exists) appears to be based largely on the 
groundless belief that GM food is dangerous to human health.19 If that belief 
is indeed groundless, public officials should correct it rather than cater to it. 
But it is possible to ask whether that conclusion is too simple. Those who 
embrace technocratic conceptions of government will have little interest in 
public fear as such. But those who favor certain forms of populism might 
insist that if people are fearful, officials should respond, not least because they 
 
Labeling 5 (Sept. 23, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), http://jjzhang.scripts.mit.edu/docs/Zhang_2014_
GMO.pdf [https://perma.cc/J9ZB-HQYT] (finding that “emphasizing mandatory disclosure of GMOs 
in food products lowers consumers’ perceived GMO safety”). 
15 See supra notes 1–2 and 11. Note, however, the important qualification that the requirement 
of a cost–benefit justification applies only “to the extent permitted by law.” Exec. Order No. 13,563, 
§ 1, 3 C.F.R. 215 (2011), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 102-02 (2012); Exec. Order No. 12,866, 
§ 1(b), 3 C.F.R. § 638 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 86-91 (2012). For that reason, the 
GMO disclosure mandate might, in this context, fall in the small category of cases in which executive 
agencies issue a rule, under legal compulsion, for which benefits do not justify costs. Nonetheless, 
the process of review will put a good deal of pressure on the Department of Agriculture to produce 
a credible explanation that the benefits justify the costs. 
16 For the legal objections potentially available, in the event that the cost–benefit analysis is 
arbitrary or does not demonstrate that the benefits justify costs, see infra note 45. Of course the fact 
that disclosure is mandatory may turn out to make those objections irrelevant. See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. 
SEC, 748 F.3d 359, 369 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (upholding a regulation by reference to statutory requirements). 
17 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Do People Like Nudges?, 68 ADMIN. L. REV. 177, 189 (2016) (noting 
that 86% of survey “respondents were in favor of requiring companies to disclose whether the food they 
sell contains” GMOs). 
18 Cf. id. (reporting that respondents were “significantly less likely to favor a law requiring 
restaurants to order the items on a menu from healthiest to unhealthiest”). 
19 See, e.g., Health Risks, INST. FOR RESPONSIBLE TECH. (2015), http://responsibletechnology.org/gmo
-education/health-risks/ [https://perma.cc/5RXV-W22B] (“Natural genes can be deleted or permanently 
turned on or off, and hundreds may change their behavior. Even the inserted gene can be damaged or 
rearranged, and may create proteins that can trigger allergies or promote disease.” (internal citations omitted)). 
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need to maintain public trust (and should themselves be humble about how 
much the evolving science can establish). 
A separate argument relies on difficult-to-quantify values and scientific 
uncertainty. Perhaps GM food would threaten biodiversity; perhaps it would 
have adverse distributional effects in poor nations; perhaps it endangers 
widely held moral commitments. If there is a risk that GM food would cause 
serious and irreversible environmental harm, it is appropriate to take 
precautions,20 and labels are a modest way of doing that. Perhaps it will be 
discovered, in the fullness of time, that the environmental risks (such as the 
risks to biodiversity) are serious and potentially even catastrophic; perhaps 
existing research cannot rule out of bounds that possibility. 
The force of at least some of these concerns depends on the science. It is 
clear that if the best reading of the science suggests a certain kind of 
irreducible uncertainty, the argument for labeling gains force, and it can be fit 
with a justification that agencies have sometimes given under the general rubric 
of cost–benefit analysis. But if the risk is vanishingly small, or too speculative 
to be worth taking seriously—as many scientists have concluded21—then 
precautions (including labels) are difficult to justify. With reference to these 
various points, I sketch the most plausible arguments that the United States 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) might make in defending the labeling 
requirement on cost–benefit grounds and suggest that some form of 
“breakeven analysis” is probably the best that it can do. 
Mandatory labels for GM foods raise pervasive questions about the use 
of cost–benefit analysis in the context of labeling requirements. As we shall 
see, that context poses distinctive challenges. The costs of labels may be higher 
than is readily apparent, because they may produce subtle decreases in 
consumer welfare (as, for example, when calorie labels lead people to buy goods 
that are lower-calorie but less tasty, or when energy efficiency labels lead people 
to purchase appliances that cost less to operate but are less attractive). 
At the same time, the benefits of labels are often exceptionally difficult to 
quantify and monetize, a problem that may lead agencies to make a flat 
declaration that they cannot be turned into monetary equivalents at all. 
Alternatively, agencies may rely on anticipated economic savings or health 
gains, which may be highly speculative, and which will not, in any case, provide 
anything like an adequate picture of the actual benefits. 
 
20 See Nabil I. Al-Najjar, A Bayesian Framework for the Precautionary Principle, J. LEGAL STUD., 
June 2015, at S337 (explaining that the “precautionary principle” counsels that when faced with 
possible threats “to human health or the environment, precautionary measures should be taken” even 
if the risks “are not fully established scientifically”). 
21 See infra notes 115–18. 
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The remainder of this Article comes in three parts. Part I, the heart of the 
analysis, offers general remarks on mandatory labels, with particular reference 
to the four approaches that agencies have taken to specifying the benefits of 
such labels. These highly disparate approaches, which impose varying levels 
of information-gathering demands on agencies, have yet to receive serious 
attention in the academic literature, and Part I explores their vices and 
virtues. Part II applies the analysis to GM foods, concluding that a mandatory 
label is not simple to justify on cost–benefit grounds, even if agencies use 
creative approaches to attempt to monetize the benefits. Part II also specifies 
the best (or least bad) approach that the government might use in attempting 
to show that the benefits of GM labels justify the costs. 
Part III investigates uncertainty and the precautionary principle. It 
emphasizes that there is room for precautions in the face of small or uncertain 
risks of catastrophe but urges that on current readings of the science, 
mandatory GM labels are not straightforward to defend on that ground. Part 
III also discusses the claim that the precautionary principle is best understood 
not in decision-theoretic terms but as a response to democratic imperatives. 
I. PRODUCT LABELING IN GENERAL 
A. Market Failure? 
When should government require products to be labeled? Suppose that 
we care about social welfare, suitably specified, and answer that labels should 
be required when they would do more good than harm. It is easy to imagine 
labels that are unnecessary, that are costly to impose, that are widely ignored 
by consumers, that mislead consumers, or that promote the interests of 
powerful private groups, not of the public as a whole. It is also easy to imagine 
labels that help consumers to save money, to avoid serious risks, to protect 
third parties, or to register their deepest moral commitments. Under the 
standard economic approach, the initial question is whether there is a market 
failure. In many cases, we expect the market to produce the necessary 
information on its own.22 In other words, sellers are expected to disclose 
relevant information voluntarily.23 Mandatory disclosure is needed only when 
voluntary disclosure fails. 
 
22 See Howard Beales et al., The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information, 24 J.L. & ECON. 
491, 502 (1981) (“The economic incentive for consumers to gather information is strong. Increases 
in the efficiency of purchase decisions made are equivalent to increases in real income, and, given 
the diversity of choices available in a modem economy, improved choices can lead to a large gain. In 
many markets, price dispersion is substantial for identical or similar products.”). 
23 See id. (noting the “substantial economic incentive” that sellers have “to disseminate information 
to consumers”). 
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1. Consumer Demand and Incomplete Information 
When offering accounts of market failure under the requirements of 
prevailing executive orders, agencies usually ask about what consumers are likely 
to demand.24 A standard market failure, often invoked by agencies themselves, 
involves incomplete information. Sometimes consumers lack the information that 
would enable them to make (sufficiently informed) choices, and government 
provides that information in order to make the market work efficiently. 
It is true, of course, that consumers sometimes insist on product-related 
information, and hence the market will provide it; there is no need for a 
mandate. But consumers might not have the information that would put them 
in the position to demand disclosure of (further) information, and it might 
not be rational for them to attempt to acquire that information. Consider the 
health risks posed by trans fats, which raise highly technical questions.25 
Rational ignorance on the part of consumers might lead them not to acquire 
information from which they would ultimately benefit. Without that 
information, they might lack the knowledge that would lead them to even ask 
for labels. For that reason, a government response might be appropriate. 
A further problem stems from the fact that information has the 
characteristics of a public good, which means that the market will not generate 
enough of it.26 Acting on his or her own, each consumer might not seek 
information from which all or most consumers would benefit. Mandatory labels 
overcome a collective action problem. 
Yet another problem arises when the point of disclosure is to protect third 
parties.27 Often consumers want to know whether products are harming 
people, but even if they do not, disclosure might be required in order to 
reduce that harm. Suppose, for example, that disclosure of information is 
designed to reduce the risks of second-hand smoke, to prevent harms to animals 
(such as elephants or dolphins), to protect vulnerable groups (as with disclosure 
of “conflict minerals”28), or to protect American jobs (as with “country of 
origin” or “made in America” labels29). If third parties are at risk, we have a 
 
24 See STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 26-29 (1982) (explaining that 
reguluation is often justified as a means to correct “errors” in the supply of information to consumers). 
25 See SARAH CONLY, AGAINST AUTONOMY: JUSTIFYING COERCIVE PATERNALISM 152-55 
(2013) (discussing the decision by New York City to ban trans fat in restaurants and cafeterias). 
26  Beales et al., supra note 22, at 503 (“The first . . . market failure arises from the fact that 
information has public good properties. The purchase, production, and use of information by consumers 
generate a market-perfecting external benefit to uninformed consumers.”). 
27 See Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Moral Commitments in Cost-Benefit Analysis 4 (Coase-Sandor 
Inst. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 802, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=2930450 [https://perma.cc/HC2N-RALH]. 
28 See infra note 47. 
29 See 7 U.S.C. § 1638a (2012) (requiring retailers of particular products to inform their consumers 
of each product’s country of origin); Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 23 (D.C. Cir. 
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standard argument for government intervention. To the extent that GM food 
is thought to pose risks to the environment, a market failure seems to be 
involved. It is true, of course, that the preferred response to such risks is some 
kind of corrective tax, not disclosure.30 But if a tax is unavailable, for political 
or other reasons, then disclosure might seem to be a reasonable second-best. 
There are behavioral issues as well. If risks are not sufficiently salient, then 
consumers might not demand relevant information about them, even if those 
risks are not exactly trivial. In principle, disclosure could therefore increase 
consumer welfare.31 Or suppose that health risks are long-term; if so, then 
“present bias” might lead consumers not to demand information about 
them.32 It is true that in the face of present bias, disclosure might not do much 
good; present-biased consumers might not care about what they learn. But 
perhaps information could be provided in a way that would reduce present 
bias. For example, labels might be graphic or specifically focus people on what 
might happen in the long-term. 
2. Producer Behavior 
Notwithstanding these points, a standard unraveling argument predicts 
voluntary disclosure even if consumers do not demand it. Assume that for 
whatever reason (rational or not), consumers would choose non-GM foods if 
they were given the information that would enable them to do so. Specifically, 
assume that consumers are willing to pay $10 for GM salmon and $20 for non-GM 
salmon. Further, assume that GM salmon costs $5 to produce, whereas non-GM 
salmon costs $7 to produce. Finally, assume that, initially, half the salmon on 
the market is GM and half is not. Without any labeling, the consumer would 
not know what kind of salmon she is buying and would, therefore, be willing to 
pay $15 (= 0.5*$10 + 0.5*$20). This state of (consumer) ignorance benefits the 
producers of GM salmon and harms the producers of non-GM salmon. 
 
2014) (“But here we think several aspects of the government’s interest in country-of-origin labeling 
for food combine to make the interest substantial: the context and long history of country-of-origin 
disclosures to enable consumers to choose American-made products; the demonstrated consumer 
interest in extending country-of-origin labeling to food products; and the individual health concerns 
and market impacts that can arise in the event of a food-borne illness outbreak.”). 
30 See Steven Shavell, Corrective Taxation Versus Liability as a Solution to the Problem of Harmful 
Externalities, 54 J.L. & ECON. S249, S249 (2011) (“The corrective tax has long been viewed by most 
economists as a, or the, theoretically preferred remedy for the problem of harmful externalities.”). 
31 See Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information 
Suppression in Competitive Markets, 121 Q.J. ECON. 505, 511 (2006) (arguing that when consumers have 
access to more information, they are able to “make more informed choices among the available goods”). 
32 See generally Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Present Bias: Lessons Learned and To Be 
Learned, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 273, 274-75 (2015) (discussing the impact of present bias on economic 
decisionmaking). 
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But this state of ignorance is not an equilibrium. The non-GM sellers will 
voluntarily add a “No GMOs” label so that they can charge $20, rather than $15 per 
salmon (as long as the cost of adding such a label is less than $5 per salmon). The 
GM salmon will not be labeled, but GM labeling would not be necessary—rational 
consumers would infer that non-labeled salmon is GM. As Bar-Gill and Board 
explain, “An implication of this result is that mandatory disclosure of product-
attribute information is often unnecessary.”33 
In the example just given, the relevant quality dimension is binary (GMO 
or non-GMO). A similar argument predicts voluntary disclosure when the 
relevant quality dimension is continuous. Assume that different microwave 
ovens in the market emit radiation in the range of 0–10 mW/cm2, with levels 
of radiation distributed uniformly (such that, for example, the number of 
microwave ovens emitting no radiation is equal to the number of ovens 
emitting 1 mW/cm2 of radiation, and equal to the number of ovens emitting 
2 mW/cm2 of radiation, and so on). Without any labeling, consumers would 
not be able to distinguish low-radiation ovens from high-radiation ovens and 
would attribute the average radiation level, 5 mW/cm2, to any oven they 
consider purchasing. Producers of low-radiation ovens, with radiation levels 
below 5 mW/cm2, would be harmed by this state of consumer ignorance. 
These producers would voluntarily disclose their ovens’ radiation levels. 
Now consumers would know the radiation levels of all ovens with levels 
below 5 mW/cm2. And when considering a non-labeled oven, the consumer 
would assume an average radiation level of 7.5 mW/cm2. But then producers 
with radiation levels between 5–7.5 mW/cm2 will voluntarily disclose. Only 
producers with radiation levels between 7.5–10 mW/cm2 will remain silent, 
and so consumers would attribute an average radiation level of 8.75 mW/cm2 
to a non-labeled oven. Now producers with levels between 7.5–8.75 mW/cm2 
will voluntarily disclose. And so on, until complete unraveling is achieved 
and all information is voluntarily disclosed.34 
As a real-world example analogous to the question of GM food, consider 
the example of gluten free foods. Some people (including those with celiac 
disease) are allergic to food that contains gluten. At least to date, we do not 
observe statutory disclosure requirements (“Warning: this product contains 
gluten.”). Instead we see voluntary labels, saying (for example) that products 
are “gluten free.” The FDA has issued guidance for such labels.35 On admittedly 
optimistic assumptions, voluntary labels provide sufficient information. 
 
33 Oren Bar-Gill & Oliver Board, Product-Use Information and the Limits of Voluntary Disclosure, 
14 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 235, 237 (2012). 
34 See id. (explaining the “unraveling dynamic [that] leads to voluntary disclosure by all firms”). 
35 For a summary of gluten-free labeling from the FDA itself, see Gluten and Food Labeling, U.S. 
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/GuidanceDocumentsRegulatory
Information/Allergens/ucm367654.htm [https://perma.cc/VVP8-98YG] (last updated May 2, 2016). 
1054 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 165: 1043 
3. Markets that Do Not Unravel 
This happy unraveling story, however, does not always play out. Failure 
of voluntary disclosure occurs for several reasons—some neoclassical and 
some behavioral. Starting with the standard, neoclassical reasons, note that 
the unraveling result assumes that voluntary disclosure is truthful. But 
imperfect enforcement might lead to false disclosures, which government 
must correct—and once government is in the business of correction, it may 
be essentially mandating a label. 
In addition, voluntary disclosure might fail when there is no standardized 
format or metric for disclosing information. Without standardization, 
consumers might not be able to make the required distinctions,36 in which 
case voluntary disclosure will be insufficient. And if the point of disclosure is 
to protect third parties, the unraveling story might not work because 
consumers might not care enough about third party effects to respond to the 
various informational signals. True, consumer indifference would also mean 
that mandatory labels would be ineffective. But it is plausible to think that 
consumers care some—enough to make mandatory labels work but not enough 
to promote unraveling. 
Behavioral economics suggests an additional and perhaps stronger reason 
for skepticism about voluntary disclosure. The unraveling result assumes that 
consumers attend to and draw rational inferences from silence—from the 
absence of a label. But attention is limited,37 and such inferences can be quite 
difficult to draw, especially when consumers are receiving numerous signals at 
the same time (as is true for food) and when there are multiple quality levels 
or continuous quality dimensions. Suppose, for example, that some products 
come with labels saying “low fat” or “low sugar.” Would consumers necessarily 
infer that products lacking such labels are high in fat or sugar? Or would many 
consumers not think much or at all about the question of fat or sugar? 
A standard neoclassical argument is that in a generalization of the “lemons 
equilibrium,”38 competition might occur over easily observed characteristics, 
such as price, and less or not at all over less observable characteristics, such 
 
36 For a discussion of neoclassical economic theories of consumer decisionmaking, see Beales 
et al., supra note 22, at 492. 
37 See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, ATTENTION AND EFFORT 13-17 (1973) (discussing constraints on 
consumer attention in relation to informed decision-making). See generally SENDHIL MULLAINATHAN 
& ELDAR SHAFIR, SCARCITY: WHY HAVING TOO LITTLE MEANS SO MUCH (2013) (examining how 
cognitive scarcity and “limited bandwidth” affect choices). 
38 See generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970) (discussing the relationship between product price and quality 
and consumer demand). 
2017] On Mandatory Labeling 1055 
as ingredients.39 The behavioral suggestion (or exclamation point) is that in 
view of the scarcity of attention, this limited kind of competition is highly 
likely.40 And even if consumers pay attention to the relevant ingredient (salt, 
sugar, fat), they might be unable to draw a fully rational inference from the 
absence of disclosure. 
For example, those who are purchasing cereal or milk might attend to a 
variety of product attributes, and unless high fat or high sugar content is 
brought to their attention, many of them might not consider those ingredients 
at all. If many consumers would not pay attention or draw a negative inference 
(or a sufficiently negative inference) from the absence of a label, voluntary 
disclosure might fail. Such failure justifies the consideration of mandatory 
disclosure, at least in principle. The Affordable Care Act, for example, mandates 
calorie labels,41 and there is a plausible argument on their behalf based on the 
considerations just sketched.42 
4. “Does Not Contain” Labels vs. “Contains” Labels 
There are many differences between a system in which products without 
some characteristic say “Does Not Contain X” and one in which products with 
some characteristic say “Contains X.” As we have seen, “Contains X” offers 
far more salient information to consumers with bounded attention. In 
addition, “Contains X” might offer a distinctive signal, suggesting that private 
and public institutions think that something is wrong with X.43 
“Does Not Contain X” might also promote a desirable form of sorting. 
Suppose that ten percent of the population is troubled by X, whereas ninety 
 
39 See Beales et al., supra note 22, at 510 (“By generalizing the concept of the ‘lemons’ 
equilibrium, we can show that, if price is more easily observed than quality, competition may be 
skewed toward less expensive, lower-quality products.” (internal citation omitted)). 
40 See Gabaix & Laibson, supra note 31, at 511 (finding that, absent consumer-education initiatives, 
consumers are likely to resort to simple baseline-price comparisons when making purchasing decisions). 
41 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 4205, 21 U.S.C. § 343(q)(5)(H)(ii)(I)(aa) 
(2012) (requiring restaurants to list “the number of calories contained in the standard menu item” 
on their menus). 
42 The FDA’s own explanation disregarded the economic literature on unraveling and spoke 
instead about how the rule might help consumers: 
The final rule may also assist consumers by making the long-term health consequences 
of consumer food choices more salient and by providing contextual cues of food 
consumption. The behavioral economics literature suggests that distortions internal 
to consumers (or internalities) due to time-inconsistent preferences, myopia or 
present-biased preferences, visceral factors (e.g., hunger), or lack of self-control, can 
also create the potential for policy intervention to improve consumer welfare. 
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA-2011-F-0172, FOOD LABELING: NUTRITION LABELING OF 
STANDARD MENU ITEMS IN RESTAURANTS AND SIMILAR RETAIL FOOD ESTABLISHMENTS 11 
(2014) [hereinafter CALORIE LABEL RULE IMPACT ANALYSIS]. 
43 See infra text accompanying notes 182–87. 
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percent is not; suppose that both groups are informed and rational. If so, there 
is no need for “Contains X.” Those who want to avoid X can easily do so, and 
those who have no interest in avoiding X need not be troubled by the issue. 
On a certain view of the facts, “Does Not Contain X” is the right approach 
both to gluten-free and to GM food. People who are allergic to gluten should 
know what to look for. The principal problem is that if they are inattentive, 
they might become sick simply by virtue of the fact that the issue has not 
been brought to their attention. (Compare labels saying “Contains peanuts” 
or “Contains shellfish,” which may be especially important if consumers are 
inattentive or if it is not self-evident that the relevant food contains either.) 
With “Does Not Contain” labels, consumers can easily avoid GM food if that 
is what they want to do. But this approach is not a solution if GM food has 
harmful systemic effects or threatens to cause environmental harm (or if 
relevant interest groups want to stigmatize GM food). 
B. Costs and Benefits 
Even if there is a market failure, the question remains: do the benefits of 
labels justify the costs? If it would be expensive to comply with a labeling 
requirement—say, $800 million annually—the question whether the benefits 
are sufficient would be put in stark relief. We could easily imagine disclosure 
requirements that do little good, perhaps because consumers pay no attention 
to them.44 If so, such requirements would be unjustified on cost–benefit 
grounds. Those who are skeptical of the benefits of disclosure requirements, 
in general or in particular cases, are not merely making a point about public 
policy. Whether or not they intend to do so, they are also making a 
provocative claim about how regulatory review should occur within the 
executive branch and potentially about judicial review as well. (Recall the 
limited nature of attention, which raises the possibility that many disclosure 
requirements could not survive scrutiny under Executive Orders 12866 and 
13563, and possibly could not survive judicial review under the Administrative 
Procedure Act.45) We could also imagine disclosure requirements from which 
 
44 See OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW: 
THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE 8, 11 (2014) (contending that “disclosures are 
unreadable and unread” and that “[o]ne Web site’s disclosure offered $100 to anyone noticing it; it 
kept its $100”); ARCHON FUNG ET AL., FULL DISCLOSURE: THE PERILS AND PROMISE OF 
TRANSPARENCY 16 (2007) (“Because information disclosers and users have limited time and energy, 
they are likely to act on new information only if it has value to them, is compatible with the way 
they make choices, and is easily comprehensible.”); George Loewenstein et al., Disclosure: Psychology 
Changes Everything, 6 ANN. REV. ECON. 391, 398-99 (2014) (discussing the impact of attention 
scarcity on the effectiveness of disclosures). 
45 On the relevance of the APA and the possibility that a failure to offer a cost–benefit 
justification can be a form of unlawful arbitrariness, see Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and 
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consumers and third parties would benefit greatly.46 But assessment of costs 
and benefits can produce a convincing legal challenge. 
As we will see, agencies have not always responded well to the difficulty 
of quantifying the costs and benefits of disclosure requirements. In fact, they 
have adopted four distinctive approaches, imposing increasingly severe 
information-gathering demands on agencies. It is not always easy to explain 
why they choose one or another in particular cases. 
The first approach—and it may be the most candid—is to confess a lack 
of knowledge by acknowledging that, in light of existing information, some 
costs and (especially) benefits simply cannot be quantified.47 The problem 
with this approach is that it suggests that the decision to proceed is essentially 
a stab in the dark.  
The second approach involves “breakeven analysis,” by which agencies 
describe what the benefits would have to be in order to justify the costs—and 
 
Arbitrariness Review, 41 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017). See also Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. 
SEC, 748 F.3d 359, 369 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (upholding a regulation by reference to statutory requirements, 
in the face of a challenge that the SEC failed to properly analyze the benefits of the rule due to a lack 
of data). To the extent that a statute requires an agency to proceed whether or not the benefits justify 
the costs—as does the GM labeling statute under discussion here—it is exceedingly unlikely that an 
inability to offer such a justification would render a regulatory decision legally vulnerable. See id. 
(“Despite the lack of data, the Commission had to promulgate a disclosure rule.”). It is possible, 
however, that the choice of a particular approach to labeling, as opposed to legally permissible 
alternatives, would be vulnerable if the latter has higher net benefits. And as noted, there will be 
considerable attention within the executive branch as to whether the benefits justify the costs. 
46 See Partha Deb & Carmen Vargas, Who Benefits from Calorie Labeling? An Analysis of Its Effects 
on Body Mass 14 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21,992, 2016), http://www.nber.
org/papers/w21992 [https://perma.cc/B695-RL98] (finding that the “mandatory calorie labeling laws 
implemented over the past few years in a number of states and counties appear to be having 
substantial effects in terms of decreased BMI following implementation of such laws”); see also 
FUNG ET AL., supra note 44, at 1-10 (discussing the virtues and power of disclosures). 
47 For an important decision upholding a refusal to quantify benefits, on the ground that 
quantification was not feasible, see Investment Co. Institute v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 
720 F.3d 370, 372-75 (D.C. Cir. 2013). In the context of disclosure, the leading decision is National Ass’n 
of Manufacturers v. SEC, which upheld against arbitrariness review a regulation that would require 
disclosure of the use of “conflict minerals”: 
An agency is not required “to measure the immeasurable,” and need not conduct a 
“rigorous, quantitative economic analysis” unless the statute explicitly directs it to do 
so. Here, the rule’s benefits would occur half-a-world away in the midst of an opaque 
conflict about which little reliable information exists, and concern a subject about 
which the Commission has no particular expertise. Even if one could estimate how 
many lives are saved or rapes prevented as a direct result of the final rule, doing so 
would be pointless because the costs of the rule—measured in dollars—would create 
an apples-to-bricks comparison. Despite the lack of data, the Commission had to 
promulgate a disclosure rule. 
748 F.3d at 369 (quoting Inv. Co. Inst. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 720 F.3d at 379). 
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suggest that the benefits are indeed likely to be of the requisite magnitude.48 
In principle, this approach is better than a simple confession of ignorance, 
and it is often the best path forward. But it involves a high degree of 
guesswork, and it may be a mere conclusion, a kind of ipse dixit, 
masquerading as an analytic device.49 Without a great deal of discipline, it 
too may not be so different from a confession of ignorance. 
The third approach is to attempt to specify outcomes in terms of (say) 
economic savings or health endpoints.50 The advantage of this approach is that 
it actually points to concrete benefits, and it attempts to measure and to 
monetize them. But it too runs into difficulties. The first is that agencies may 
lack anything like the information that would enable them to venture such a 
specification. The second and more interesting is that, for reasons I will explore, 
even an accurate specification will not give a complete picture of the actual 
benefits, and, in crucial respects, it will almost certainly overstate them.51 In brief, 
the problem is that people might experience significant losses as well as gains as 
a result of the label (for example, if they switch to a product that is inferior along 
certain dimensions), and an account of endpoints will ignore those losses. 
The fourth approach is to identify consumers’ willingness-to-pay.52 In 
principle, that approach is (mostly) the right one, because it should capture 
the full universe of losses and gains from the label. At the same time, it runs 
into serious and perhaps insuperable normative, conceptual, and empirical 
challenges.53 As we shall see, the most obvious problem is that it is difficult 
to elicit people’s informed and unbiased willingness-to-pay for labels. 
1. Costs 
On the cost side, some of the questions are relatively straightforward. 
Regulators may well be able to learn the total cost of (for example) producing 
fuel economy labels and placing them on new vehicles. The principal 
 
48 See Cass R. Sunstein, The Limits of Quantification, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1369, 1387 (2014) 
(“[T]he central goal of breakeven analysis is straightforward. It is to pose this question: How high 
would the benefits have to be, in order for the costs to be justified?”). 
49 See id. at 1392 (“When lower or upper bounds cannot be specified in any way, it might be 
objected that breakeven analysis is not much more than a description or a hunch . . . .”). 
50 See, e.g., Cary Coglianese & Gary E. Marchant, Shifting Sands: The Limits of Science in Setting 
Risk Standards, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1255, 1302 (2004) (discussing the EPA’s process of setting standards 
for fine particulate matter, which involved analysis of various health endpoints). 
51 See infra subsection I.B.2. 
52 See Sunstein, supra note 48, at 1375 (discussing the use of willingness-to-pay as a measure of 
the benefits of a regulation). 
53 See id. at 1377 (“[I]f we monetize regulatory benefits in terms of the willingness-to-pay 
criterion, we might not have an adequate measure of the welfare consequences of regulations. . . . It 
seems plain that the willingness-to-pay numbers should not be decisive when we are deciding 
whether and how to promote distributive goals.”). 
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difficulty arises when the information itself imposes costs on consumers. It is a 
mistake to ignore those costs, even if they prove difficult to quantify, and even 
if consumers benefit on net.54 Those costs come in several different forms. 
Some of them will usually be low—but not always. 
a. A Small Cognitive Tax 
First, a cost is involved in reading and processing the information.55 For 
each consumer, that cost is likely to be quite low, but across a large number 
of purchasers, it might turn out to be significant. Information disclosure is, 
in a sense, akin to a paperwork burden. To be sure, consumers are not 
compelled to read and process what is disclosed. But even for those who seek 
to ignore it, its very presence may operate as a kind of cognitive tax. 
b. A Hedonic Tax on Those Who Do Not Change Their Behavior 
Second, and more importantly, the cost may be hedonic, not cognitive.56 
Suppose that smokers are given information about the adverse health effects 
of smoking or that visitors to chain restaurants are given information about 
the caloric contents of food. Many members of both groups will suffer a 
hedonic loss. Consider, for example, smokers who cannot quit and customers 
who decide to choose high-calorie foods notwithstanding the labels. In 
hedonic terms, such people will lose, rather than gain, if they are miserable 
or at least sadder at the time of purchase.57 To be sure, there is a serious 
normative question whether regulators should count, as costs, the adverse 
hedonic effect of truthful information. (Is it a cost, or a benefit, if people learn, 
truthfully, that they have diabetes or cancer? Is there not a cost as well as a 
benefit, even if the net effect is positive?) But if we are operating within a 
welfarist framework, the hedonic loss must be treated as a cost. It might turn 
out to be low, but regulators should not ignore it (as they typically do). 
 
54 For a useful discussion in an especially controversial area, see Helen Levy et al., Tobacco 
Regulation and Cost-Benefit Analysis: How Should We Value Foregone Consumer Surplus? (Nat’l Bureau 
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22,471, 2016), http://www.nber.org/papers/w22471.pdf [https://
perma.cc/G6RD-9ZHD]. 
55 See James Gibson, Vertical Boilerplate, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 161, 171-80 (2013) (discussing 
the costs of information acquisition and processing in the context of form contracts). 
56 See John Bronsteen et al., Well-Being Analysis vs. Cost-Benefit Analysis, 62 DUKE L.J. 1603, 1608-09 
(2013) (describing the field of hedonic psychology, which measures “how much any factor improves or 
worsens” the human experience, and its implications for public policy). 
57 See Emily Oster, Calorie Counts on Menus Won’t Change What Americans Eat, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT 
(Dec. 2, 2014, 1:08 PM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/calorie-counts-on-menus-wont-change-what
-americans-eat/ [https://perma.cc/MA7E-W4MX] (“If the actual impact of calorie labeling is to encourage 
only a few people to eat fewer calories but to make many more people feel worse about themselves, it 
seems less than obvious that it is a welfare-improving idea.”). 
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c. A Hedonic Tax on Those Who Do Change Their Behavior 
Even if people might be able to quit smoking or end up choosing lower-
calorie items, and will hence benefit greatly on net, they will incur a cost by 
seeing something that inflicts pain. In principle, that cost should also count, 
even if it is greatly outweighed by benefits.58 The point, then, is not that the 
hedonic cost is a trump card; if people make different choices once they are 
informed, the presumption should be that they are better off. But by how 
much? To answer that question, the hedonic cost must be taken into account. 
For many people, a calorie label imposes a serious cost, simply because it 
informs them that the delicious cheeseburger they are about to eat is also going 
to make their belly bulge. (As a friend remarked to me after hearing that the 
calorie labeling requirement in the Affordable Care Act would be applied to 
movie theaters, “They just ruined popcorn.”) 
d. A Consumer Welfare Loss 
There is a fourth loss, in the form of foregone consumer surplus. Suppose 
that people decide that on balance, they should have a salad rather than a 
cheeseburger, on the ground that the latter has many more calories. If they 
choose the salad because of the label, they are probably better off on 
balance59—and in a sense, they are sadder but wiser (and healthier). They are 
sadder to the extent that they enjoy their meal less. Assessment of the 
magnitude of the loss poses serious conceptual and empirical challenges, but 
there is no question that it exists, and that it might turn out to be a significant 
fraction of the benefits. In principle, a decision to forego the hamburger 
might make people only modestly better off, if the hedonic loss is almost as 
high as the health gain.60 
Suppose, for example, that consumers are choosing between two essentially 
equivalent cars; that the more fuel-efficient one would cost $2000 less annually 
to operate because of its fuel efficiency; that the less fuel-efficient one would 
 
58 See Hunt Allcott & Cass R. Sunstein, Regulating Internalities, 34 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 
698, 704 (2015) (laying out a “model . . . [for] how policy intervention can increase welfare, whether by 
restricting choices, changing prices, or by ‘nudging’ individuals toward privately-optimal decisions”). 
59 The assumption here is that people know what is the best choice for them, once they are 
informed, but a behavioral bias cannot be entirely ruled out. 
60 I am bracketing here the possible endogeneity of preferences. See PREFERENCE CHANGE: 
APPROACHES FROM PHILOSOPHY, ECONOMICS AND PSYCHOLOGY 4 (Till Grüne-Yanoff & Sven 
Ove Hansson eds., 2009) (discussing the work of economists to incorporate indiviudals’ changing 
preferenes into models of supply and demand). Suppose that at Time 1, people enjoy hamburgers a lot 
and enjoy salads only a little. Now suppose that people switch at Time 2 because they want to eat 
healthier. At Time 3, people might come to dislike hamburgers (disgusting!) and to love salad (fresh!). 
In principle, preference change must be taken into account by the considered cost–benefit analysis, 
though doing so presents serious challenges: it might be difficult to know the magnitude of the change 
and even the sign (perhaps those who switch to salad will crave hamburgers and grow to despise salad). 
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cost $500 upfront; and that because of the fuel economy label, they select the 
fuel-efficient car. For each such consumer, we might be tempted to say that 
the label has produced $1500 in gains. But in actual practice, the effects of a 
fuel economy label will be much more complicated to assess. Some consumers 
will end up purchasing cars that are more fuel-efficient but inferior along 
some dimension, so that they will gain $1500 minus X, where X refers to the 
desirable features of the unchosen car that they otherwise prefer. It is hard 
for public officials to know whether X is, on average, $100, or $1000, or $1450.61 
2. Benefits 
On the benefits side, the assessment is even more challenging.62 If the 
government mandates a fuel economy label, agencies should project the 
economic and environmental benefits from the mandate. But to do that, they 
have to know the effect of labels on behavior. In principle, a randomized controlled 
trial would be valuable and perhaps necessary for that purpose. If one group 
sees a particular label and a similar group sees a different label (or no label), 
regulators should be able to specify the effect of the label on purchasing 
 
61 This claim does not depend on the objection that a fleet-wide fuel-efficiency requirement will 
impose costs in the form of a less attractive fleet (with, for example, less powerful vehicles). See Ted 
Gayer & W. Kip Viscusi, Overriding Consumer Preferences with Energy Regulations 16 (Mercatus Ctr., 
George Mason Univ., Working Paper No. 12-21, 2012), http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/Energy_
regulations_GayerViscusi_WP1221_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/2UHC-HWHS] (arguing against use of 
bounded rationality to assess the benefits of fuel economy regulations). All that is necessary is that 
consumers choose more fuel-efficient vehicles over vehicles that are better along some dimension. 
62 For example, according to the Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of 
Transportation, speaking of new fuel economy labels, 
The agencies recognize that Executive Order 13563 directs agencies “to use the best 
available techniques to quantify anticipated present and future benefits as accurately 
as possible.” In this context, however, quantitative information is not available, and 
the agencies have therefore chosen instead to continue with a qualitative assessment 
of benefits. It is difficult to develop a good baseline for the fleet using the existing 
label, partly because the existing label is not designed to incorporate advanced 
technology vehicles. It is even more difficult to develop a comparison for the fleet with 
the new labels, because the effects of label designs on vehicle purchases are not known. 
Thus, any assessment of quantitative effects of label design on vehicle sales involves a 
great deal of speculation. The agencies believe that informed choice is an end in itself, 
even if it is hard to quantify; the agencies also believe that the new labels will provide 
significant benefits for consumers, including economic benefits, though these benefits 
cannot be quantified at this time.  
Revisions and Additions to Motor Vehicle Fuel Economy Label, 76 Fed. Reg. 39,478, 39,517 
(proposed July 6, 2011) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86, 600; 49 C.F.R. pt. 575) [hereinafter 
Fuel Economy Labels Rule]. In short, “The primary benefits associated with this rule are associated 
with improved consumer decision-making resulting from improved presentation of information. At 
this time, EPA and NHTSA do not have data to quantify these impacts.” Id. 
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decisions. Armed with that information, they could estimate economic and 
environmental consequences (at least if they could generalize from the trial). 
Unfortunately, it is sometimes difficult or impossible to run randomized 
controlled trials. In these circumstances, making any kind of projection of 
how consumers will react to a label is exceedingly difficult. An additional 
problem is that for the reasons given thus far, the projection would not give 
an adequate estimate of the (net) benefits. We have seen that if people are 
buying cars that are more fuel-efficient but otherwise highly undesirable, 
there will be a welfare loss. For that reason, regulators might explore the issue 
from another direction.63 Rather than asking about the economic savings 
from the fuel-efficient car, they might ask an entirely different question: how 
much would consumers be willing to pay for a fuel economy label? 
Under ideal conditions, the right question for regulators to ask involves 
willingness-to-pay; they should not focus on the economic benefits that 
consumers might receive if (for example) they purchase more fuel-efficient 
cars.64 The reason is that on optimistic assumptions, the willingness-to-pay 
question ought to capture everything that matters to consumers.65 (Of course 
it is true that the question will not fully capture third-party effects.) 
 
63 See Hunt Allcott & Judd B. Kessler, The Welfare Effects of Nudges: A Case Study of Energy Use 
Social Comparisons 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21,671, 2015), http://www.
nber.org/papers/w21671 [https://perma.cc/9MD3-8QX2] (noting that nudges “can affect behavior 
without changing prices or choice sets”). 
64 See id. at 1 (responding to policy interventions by “measur[ing] consumer welfare . . . by 
willingness-to-pay”). 
65 See id. at 7-8 (defining a formula to measure consumer welfare). As noted, I am assuming that 
the answers to this question are not a product of an absence of relevant information or behavioral biases. 
I am also bracketing some questions about the difference between subjective and objective welfare. See 
MATTHEW D. ADLER, WELL-BEING AND FAIR DISTRIBUTION: BEYOND COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
165-66 (2012) (noting various philosophical approaches to studying well-being, including subjective 
“individual well-being” and the “‘objective list’ approach”); JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES: STUDIES IN 
THE SUBVERSION OF RATIONALITY 125 (1983) (considering adaptive preferences and the interplay 
between power, freedom, and welfare, underscoring “freedom and how it is related to welfare”); 
MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES: THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT APPROACH 81 
(2011) (defending the capabilities approach while also discussing the “welfarist” approach, which 
“ask[s] what people’s preferences would be if they had full and comprehensive information”). The 
difference between subjective and objective welfare might turn out to be relevant in some health-related 
contexts. See CALORIE LABEL RULE IMPACT ANALYSIS, supra note 42, at 62 (relying on “willingness-
to-pay for nutrition information . . . to estimate welfare gain that serves as our estimate of the benefits 
of the final rule”). For example, the Calorie Label Rule Impact Analysis undertook quantifying the 
potential benefits of the regulation in the following way, 
We begin by describing a study (Abaluck 2011) that estimates the welfare gains from 
increased nutritional information provided by the Nutrition Labeling and Education 
Act of 1990 (NLEA) and additional labeling (i.e. extending nutritional information 
provided by the NLEA to include food away from home, fresh produce, and meats); 
our primary estimate of the benefits of the final rule uses the willingness-to-pay for 
nutrition information from that study to estimate welfare gain that serves as our 
estimate of the benefits of the final rule (Ref. 43). Next, we provide a thorough review 
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As an empirical matter, however, it is not easy to obtain a reliable answer 
to that question, or anything close to it. We might simply ask people, but for 
their answers to be relevant, it would be important to provide pertinent 
information66—for example, about the potential benefits (purely economic 
and otherwise) of labels. Providing that information is no simple endeavor, 
not least because offering some numbers about those potential benefits would 
be important, and any numbers might “anchor” consumers and hence bias 
their answers.67 Suppose that the problem of anchoring could be overcome 
and that informed consumers would be willing to pay (say) $10, on average, 
for fuel economy labels. If so, we might have some sense of the benefits, at 
least if behavioral biases are not distorting people’s answers. Unfortunately, 
however, such biases might well produce distortions; consider present bias 
and optimistic bias, which may lead to unduly low willingness-to-pay. In any 
case, survey evidence is imperfectly reliable, in part because of the familiar 
problems with contingent valuation studies,68 in part because of the immense 
difficulty of informing consumers in a sufficiently neutral way.69 
For health-related disclosures, the problem is even harder. One goal of 
calorie labels, for example, is to reduce obesity, which causes an assortment of 
health problems, including premature mortality.70 Regulators have established 
 
of the literature on the potential effects of interventions similar to the final rule on 
consumer behavior. We then compare the main benefit estimate with two 
supplemental, illustrative examples of benefits using the literature’s average reduction 
in calories consumed at restaurants due to menu labeling. These supplemental 
estimates are not included in the final reported values. Last, we conduct a sensitivity 
analysis and discuss the sources of uncertainty in our estimate.  
Id. at 62-63. 
66 This is an objection to the particular numbers produced by Allcott and Kessler, supra note 
63, at 19-21, 27-29, in their valuable paper on the welfare effects of nudges. In their study, information 
was not provided to participants, so the elicited responses regarding willingness-to-pay for energy 
conservation notices are insufficiently informed. See id. at 9-15 (explaining the experimental design). 
Nonetheless, Allcott and Kessler convincingly argue that, in principle, willingness-to-pay is the right 
question, id. at 33, subject to the qualifications in supra notes 63–65 and accompanying text. 
67 See Nicholas Epley & Thomas Gilovich, The Anchoring-and-Adjustment Heuristic: Why the 
Adjustments Are Insufficient, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 311, 311 (2006) (noting that “the starting information, 
or anchor, tends to exert drag on the subsequent adjustment process, leaving final estimates too close 
to the original anchor”). 
68 See Jerry Hausman, Contingent Valuation: From Dubious to Hopeless, 26 J. ECON. PERSP. 43, 
44 (2012) (noting that “the results of [contingent valuation] surveys are unlikely to be accurate 
predictors of informed opinion. Contingent valuation about specific projects does not improve the 
inputs to the analysis, so it should not be included in the policy analysis”). 
69 Researchers might want to inform consumers about the economic savings from a fuel-efficient 
car, but that number is highly likely to serve as an anchor, biasing judgments. See supra note 67. 
70 See Calorie Label Rule, 21 C.F.R. § 101.78 (2016) (discussing the relationship between diet 
and cancer risk); see also CALORIE LABEL RULE IMPACT ANALYSIS, supra note 42, at 65 (noting that 
“consumption of more calories than is necessary to maintain a healthy weight is one of the primary 
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ways to turn health-endpoints into monetary equivalents. For example, a 
statistical death is now valued at about nine million dollars.71 But how many 
premature deaths would be prevented by calorie labels? And what would be 
the effect of such labels on adverse health outcomes short of death? 
To answer such questions, regulators have to undertake two tasks. First, 
they must begin by making some prediction about the effect of calorie labels 
on what people choose to eat.72 Second, they have to follow that prediction 
by specifying the health consequences of lower levels of caloric intake.73 At 
least it can be said that if they can accomplish those tasks, they will have some 
sense of the benefits of the labels, once (and this is a third task) they turn the 
various consequences into monetary equivalents.74 After undertaking all three 
tasks, regulators will have specified endpoints—but for the reasons given, a 
specification of endpoints will overstate benefits because it will not include 
various cognitive and hedonic losses. 
 
risk factors for overweight and obesity . . . . [M]any menu labeling studies provide evidence to 
suggest that calorie intake will be influenced by the nutrition labeling requirements”). 
71 See, e.g., Memorandum from Kathryn Thomson, Gen. Counsel & Carlos Monje, Assistant 
Sec’y for Policy, U.S. Dep’t of Transp., to Secretarial Officers & Modal Adm’rs, U.S. Dep’t of Transp. 
2 (June 17, 2015), https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/VSL2015_0.pdf [https://
perma.cc/C6RQ-4ZXR] (“On the basis of the best available evidence, this guidance identifies $9.4 
million as the value of a statistical life.”); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, VALUING LIFE: HUMANIZING 
THE REGULATORY STATE 85 (2014) (providing the underlying theory and a discussion of how 
“agencies . . . assign monetary values to the human lives that would be saved by a proposed regulation”). 
72 See id. (noting that a calorie labeling rule would have the benefit of “decreasing the consumption 
of calories from standard menu items”). 
73 See id. (specifying that the benefits of the rule were measured “as the direct medical costs and 
total burden of lost quality adjusted life years (QALYs) that could be averted from an improved diet 
. . . minus the value of lost utility from reduced or altered consumption”). 
74 See CALORIE LABEL RULE IMPACT ANALYSIS, supra note 42, at 89 (discussing the 
methodology used to assume numerical figures to the proposed benefits of the rule). For another 
example, see Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,628, 
36,719 (proposed June 22, 2011) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1141), http://www.fda.gov/downloads
/TobaccoProducts/Labeling/RulesRegulationsGuidance/UCM339834.pdf [https://perma.cc/UY5U-
JJEE] [hereinafter Graphic Warnings for Cigarettes Rule], explaining, 
We estimate the benefits of the final rule by comparing expected life-cycle events of 
smokers with those of nonsmokers. Nonsmokers tend to live longer and develop fewer 
cancers, cardiovascular, pulmonary, and other diseases, so the benefits in our analysis 
include the discounted value of life-years gained, health status improvements and 
medical services freed for other uses. We also include an estimate of the monetary value 
of the property and lives saved as a result of the rule-induced reduction in the number 
of accidental fires caused by smoking. There are other benefits, such as reductions in 
nonsmokers’ morbidity and mortality associated with both passive smoking and mothers 
smoking during pregnancy, that are likely generated by the final rule, but FDA has been 
unable to obtain reliable data with which to quantify them. In particular, we were not 
able to project future levels of exposure to secondhand smoke from historical trends, nor 
predict future decreases in maternal smoking during pregnancy. 
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Alternatively, we could (again) ask how much people would be willing to pay 
for calorie labels.75 As before, asking that question is, in principle, preferable to 
an effort to assess health-states because the answer will capture all variables that 
matter to consumers.76 Also, as before, there are formidable challenges in using 
surveys to elicit reliable numbers free from biases of various kinds. 
In light of these challenges, regulators have two reasonable options. First, 
they can work on the two relevant tracks to try to produce answers: exploring 
end-points and enlisting surveys. On prominent occasions, they have tried the 
former.77 Second, they can acknowledge the difficulties, confess that they 
cannot surmount them, and use “breakeven analysis,” by which they ask what 
the benefits would have to be, in order to justify the costs, and then do what 
they can to generate a reasonable lower bound.78 Suppose, for example, that an 
 
75 See Maria L. Loureiro et al., Do Consumers Value Nutritional Labels?, 33 EUR. REV. AGRIC. 
ECON. 249, 263 (2006) (finding that “on average, consumers are willing to pay close to 11 per cent above 
the initial price to obtain cookies with nutritional labelling”); see also id. at 249 (“Consistent with prior 
expectations, our results also indicate a difference between the [willingness-to-pay] of individuals 
suffering from diet-related health problems (estimated mean 13 per cent) and those who do not 
suffer any diet-related health problems (estimated mean 9 per cent).”). 
76  In the words of the FDA, 
To our knowledge, Abaluck (2011) is the only study that translates the potential effect 
of increasing nutrition information on consumption into estimates of welfare gains 
using willingness-to-pay based on revealed preferences (Ref. 43). This study uses the 
variation in nutrition information generated by Nutrition Labeling and Education Act 
(NLEA) as a method to determine how changes in individuals’ beliefs about nutrient 
content affect consumption decisions. The differential changes in nutrition information 
across food categories, measured in units of calories per gram, allow the study to identify 
a general model of food demand as a function of nutrient characteristics that accounts 
for the total daily diet, prior beliefs about nutrient content, and preferences, including 
willingness to substitute across food categories. 
CALORIE LABEL RULE IMPACT ANALYSIS, supra note 42, at 64. As before, however, the willingness-
to-pay criterion may run into normative objections, even from the standpoint of welfare. See generally 
JOHN BRONSTEEN ET AL., HAPPINESS AND THE LAW (2015) (raising questions about willingness-
to-pay in view of people’s occasional failure to know what will promote their welfare). 
77 See Graphic Warnings for Cigarettes Rule, supra note 74, at 36,719 (noting the longer lifespans, 
fewer cancers and diseases, as well as increased property and monetary values of non-smokers); Improve 
Tracking of Workplace Injuries and Illnesses, 81 Fed. Reg. 29,624, 29,628 (proposed May 12, 2016) (to be 
codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 1904, 1902) [hereinafter OSHA Reporting Requirement Rule] (requiring that 
employees have access to OSHA logs); Fuel Economy Labels Rule, supra note 62, at 39,517 (“The agencies 
believe that informed choice is an end in itself, even if it is hard to quantify; the agencies also believe that 
the new labels will provide significant benefits for consumers, including economic benefits, though these 
benefits cannot be quantified at this time.”); see also CALORIE LABEL RULE IMPACT ANALYSIS, supra 
note 42, at 11 (“The final rule may also assist consumers by making the long-term health consequences of 
consumer food choices more salient and by providing contextual cues of food consumption.”). 
78 See Sunstein, supra note 48, at 1372 (“Breakeven analysis . . . is a way to engage in a form of 
cost-benefit analysis (understood with suitable capaciousness) when regulators face serious 
limitations in knowledge.”). The FDA ultimately chose an approach of this kind in an important 
regulation involving tobacco products. For an outline and a discussion of the context of this decision, 
see Levy et al., supra note 54, at 8, which explains, 
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energy-efficiency label for refrigerators would cost $10 million annually and that 
eight million refrigerators are sold in the United States every year. Even if the 
average consumer saves only $0.50 annually as a result of the label, the cost will be 
made up in just three years. Breakeven analysis can be crude, but in some cases, it 
will suggest that the argument for labels is either very strong or very weak.79 
3. Third Parties—and Morality 
Some actual or imaginable labels are meant to protect third parties, not 
consumers as such. Suppose that some or many consumers are concerned 
about the use of certain minerals to finance mass atrocities, and they favor 
labeling, or some kind of disclosure requirement, so that consumers can 
decline to purchase products that contain such minerals.80 Or suppose that 
consumers care about where goods were made, perhaps because they want to 
purchase products from their own nation or perhaps because they do not want 
to purchase products from nations that do not respect human rights. They 
might seek “country of origin” labels for that reason.81 Or suppose that some 
or many consumers care about the welfare of animals in general or certain 
animals in particular; because they do, they seek labels to reflect how animals 
were (mis)treated. 
In some of these cases, the third-party effects are not obscure, and the real 
challenge is how to quantify them. As before, it is necessary to begin by making 
 
A more recent rule issued by the FDA in April 25, 2014 proposes deeming tobacco 
products such as cigars and e-cigarettes subject to FDA regulation. Although the 
regulatory impact analysis accompanying this proposed rule avoids even using the 
term “consumer surplus” (referring instead to “full welfare gains”), the approach is 
conceptually similar to the regulatory impact analysis accompanying the final rule for 
the graphic warning labels, with foregone consumer surplus offsetting 67 to 84 percent 
of the value of smokers’ private health gains. The regulatory impact analysis 
accompanying the final version of this rule, released in May 2016, backed away from 
this estimate. Instead, the May 2016 analysis took a “breakeven” approach that did not 
quantify the rule’s benefits but instead calculated how large the benefits of the rule 
would have to be to justify the costs (which are quantified), effectively sidestepping 
the question of how large the consumer surplus offset should be. 
79 See OSHA Reporting Requirement Rule, supra note 77, at 29,686 (stating that “if the final 
rule leads to either 1.5 fewer fatalities or 0.025 percent fewer injuries per year, the rule’s benefits will 
be equal to or greater than the costs. Many accident-prevention measures will have some costs, but 
even if these costs are 75 percent of the benefits, the final rule will have benefits exceeding costs if 
it prevented 4.8 fatalities or 0.8 percent fewer injuries per year. OSHA expects the rule’s beneficial 
effects to exceed these values”). 
80 See generally Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 800 F.3d 518 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (addressing the 
constitutionality of “conflict minerals” disclosures required under Dodd–Frank). For a general discussion 
of conflicts minerals regulation, see Posner & Sunstein, supra note 27, at 17-19. 
81 See Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 23 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (noting the “the context 
and long history of country-of-origin disclosures to enable consumers to choose American-made products”). 
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some projections about consumer behavior. To what extent would consumers 
change their purchasing habits in response? Even if that question can be 
answered, it would be necessary to tie any such changes to reduced harm or 
increased benefit for third parties. And even if that problem can be resolved, it 
would be necessary to quantify and monetize the resulting effects. It is no 
wonder that in the context of conflict minerals, the agency concluded that 
quantification was not possible.82 Perhaps it should have engaged in some form 
of breakeven analysis, explaining that the requirement was likely to survive 
cost–benefit analysis even if its effect were modest. But perhaps it lacked the 
information that would have allowed it to make that analysis plausible.83 
Some disclosure requirements, including mandatory labels, are not simple 
to defend within a standard cost–benefit framework, not for the reasons I 
have been sketching, but because considerations of equity, distributional 
effects, or human dignity are involved. When values of this kind are involved, 
it is perfectly legitimate for agencies to consider them.84 Under the prevailing 
executive order, it might well be sufficient for agencies simply to point to such 
considerations and not to fold them into a cost–benefit analysis.85 Agencies are 
authorized to give independent consideration to equity and human dignity.86 If 
the statutory goal is to achieve distributional goals, by transferring resources 
from some people to others, then cost–benefit balancing is not the rule of 
decision, and it is not all that matters. A rule might have costs in excess of 
benefits, in the sense that the losers lose more than the winners gain, but 
perhaps the winners are poor or otherwise deprived, and perhaps have a 
special claim to attention under the relevant law or as a matter of principle.87 
 
82 See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 800 F.3d at 547 (“The Commission was ‘unable to readily 
quantify’ the ‘compelling social benefits’ the rule was supposed to achieve: reducing violence and 
promoting peace and stability in the Congo.” (quoting Conflict Materials, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,274, 56,350 
(Sept. 12, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240 & 249b))). 
83 On the importance of including consumers’ willingness-to-pay to protect their own moral 
commitments, see Posner & Sunstein, supra note 27, at 16. 
84 See Exec. Order 13,563, § 1, 3 C.F.R. 215, 216 (2011), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 102-02 (2012) 
(“Where appropriate and permitted by law, each agency may consider (and discuss qualitatively) values 
that are difficult or impossible to quantify, including equity, human dignity, fairness, and distributive 
impacts.”). I am bracketing some theoretical issues here. See generally LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN 
SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE (2006), which explores economic and moral arguments 
and concludes that welfare is the appropriate criteria for evaluating legal rules.  
85 See Exec. Order 13,563, § 1, 3 C.F.R. 215 (directing agencies to “propose or adopt a regulation 
only upon a reasoned determination that its benefits justify its costs (recognizing that some benefits 
and costs are difficult to quantify)”). 
86 See supra note 84. 
87 On the complexities here, see W. Kip Viscusi, Risk Equity, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 843, 853 (2000), 
which states, “Market outcomes that generate the same risk levels as would benefit-cost analysis will 
differ in an important way in that those bearing the risk will receive some form of compensation in 
terms of higher wages or lower prices for the risk. In the situation of risk regulation coupled with a 
complete lack of information regarding the risk, there will be no associated compensation.” See also 
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I have suggested that if quantification of the benefits of labels is required, 
the question might be: how much would (informed) consumers be willing to 
pay for such labels? Within a certain framework, that question is the right 
one. But it is not at all clear that the framework is the right one. If the issue 
involves human dignity, equity, or distributional considerations—or any kind 
of harm to third parties—why should the proper analysis depend on how 
much people are willing to pay for it? It seems senseless to say that labels 
motivated by distributive goals should be imposed to the extent that people 
are willing to pay for them. 
To say this is not to say that consequentialist considerations do not matter 
at all. Insofar as harms to third parties are involved, cost–benefit analysis can 
be used, acknowledging the empirical problems sketched above. Insofar as the 
issue involves equity or dignity, breakeven analysis might be useful.88 To the 
extent that distributive goals are involved, a key question is whether such goals 
would, in fact, be promoted by labels or disclosure. That question would seem 
relevant to the “conflict minerals” problem.89 Some kind of means–ends analysis, 
explaining how the means are connected to the ends, would seem indispensable 
to an evaluation of labels that are designed to promote distributive goals (or for 
that matter equity or human dignity). Agencies should be expected to undertake 
that analysis—or to explain why they cannot. 
4. Risk–Risk Tradeoffs: A Brisk Note 
Some labels might reduce risks but also simultaneously create risks. Suppose, 
for example, that consumers are concerned about Omicron Z (a hypothetical 
ingredient) and the government responds with a mandatory label. Suppose 
too that if consumers shift from products with Omicron Z, they will purchase 
products that contain higher risks. If so, labels will increase risks on balance. 
As we shall see, the problem is not hypothetical: products that are GMO-free 
create risks of their own. 
II. GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS 
I now turn to the question of mandatory labels for GM foods. As we shall 
see, all of the points discussed thus far—and especially the question of valuing 
benefits—must be taken into account by the USDA when it produces a 
regulatory impact analysis to accompany implementing regulations. I offer 
 
SUNSTEIN, supra note 71, at 127-30 (noting that society may want to promote a goal that achieves 
certain goals, even when the “losers” lose more than the “winners” win). 
88 For an explanation with examples, see Sunstein, supra note 48, at 1387-89, which offers a 
number of illustrative examples of breakeven analysis. 
89 See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
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two general conclusions. The first is that it will not be easy for the USDA to 
show that the benefits of the mandate justify the costs. The second is that, of 
the USDA’s various options, the best (or least bad) is probably to use breakeven 
analysis, accompanied by an account of consumers’ desire to be informed or by 
reference to the remaining uncertainties about the environmental risks of GM 
foods. In view of the highly technical nature of some of the underlying 
questions, and the existence of reasonable disputes among specialists, my goal 
is less to offer final conclusions about the cost–benefit analysis for GMO labels 
than to outline the considerations that must be taken into account by those 
who must produce that analysis. 
A. A Little Science 
1. Definition and Pervasiveness 
The World Health Organization defines GMOs as “organisms . . . in 
which the genetic material (DNA) has been altered in a way that does not 
occur naturally.”90 According to a common understanding, a GMO is “one 
that has been deliberately created to contain a piece of ‘foreign’ DNA, usually 
a full-length ‘foreign’ gene incorporated in its genome.”91 As a result of the 
underlying technology, sometimes called “recombinant DNA technology” or 
“genetic engineering,” certain individual genes are transferred into one 
organism from another.92 The magnitude of the benefits of GM foods is 
disputed, but they can potentially grow faster, taste better, resist diseases, have 
a lower reliance on pesticides, cost less to produce, and prove more nutritious.93 
In the United States, GM food has become pervasive. According to the 
UDSA, adoption of GM “crop varieties by U.S. farmers has reached about 
90 percent of the planted acres of corn, soybeans, and cotton.”94 American 
 
90 Food Safety: Frequently Asked Questions on Genetically Modified Foods, WORLD HEALTH ORG., 
http://www.who.int/foodsafety/areas_work/food-technology/faq-genetically-modified-food/en/ [https://
perma.cc/JF9F-6Q6C]. 
91 R. Michael Roberts, Genetically Modified Organisms for Agricultural Food Production: The 
Extent of the Art and the State of the Science, in LABELING GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOOD, supra 
note 6, at 10-11. 
92 See id. at 11-12 (providing a brief overview of the process of creating GMOs). 
93 See Hans De Steur et al., Status and Market Potential of Transgenic Biofortified Crops, 33 
NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 25, 25-26 (2015) (describing “Golden Rice,” which is fortified with vitamin 
A and was able to “expand the range of micronutrient strategies available to malnourished populations”); 
L.L. Wolfenbarger & P.R. Phifer, The Ecological Risks and Benefits of Genetically Engineered Plants, 290 SCI. 
2088, 2091 (2000) (discussing sustainability of crops that have “insecticidal properties, viral resistance, or 
herbicide tolerance”). 
94 JORGE FERNANDEZ-CORNEJO ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., NO. 162, GENETICALLY 
ENGINEERED CROPS IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (2014), https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications
/err162/43668_err162.pdf [https://perma.cc/H7H5-W4B4]. 
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“consumers eat many products derived from these crops—including cornmeal, 
oils, and sugars—”even though they are generally unaware of that fact.95 In 
American supermarkets, GM ingredients can be found in about 70 percent of 
processed foods.96 Among them are pizza, cookies, ice cream, salad dressing, 
corn syrup and chips. Consider the following figure:  
 
Figure 1: Adoption of Genetically Engineered Crops 
in the United States, 1996–201697 
 
 
2. Benefits 
Do GM foods have significant benefits? The answer is sharply disputed, and 
I hardly mean to settle it here, but the standard arguments on behalf of GM 
ingredients are that they can produce superior foods with not only more 
 
95 Id. 
96 See About Genetically Engineered Foods, CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY, http://www.centerforfood
safety.org/issues/311/ge-foods/about-ge-foods [https://perma.cc/H7PK-FDYL] (“It has been estimated 
that upwards of 75% of processed foods on supermarket shelves – from soda to soup, crackers to 
condiments – contain genetically engineered ingredients.”). 
97 Recent Trends in GE Adoption, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ECON. RES. SERV., http://www.ers.usda
.gov/data-products/adoption-of-genetically-engineered-crops-in-the-us/recent-trends-in-ge-adoption.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/DC3L-YU7M] (last updated Nov. 3, 2016). See also id. (“Data for each crop category 
include varieties with both HT and Bt (stacked) traits. Sources: USDA, Economic Research Service 
using data from Fernandez-Cornejo and McBride (2002) for the years 1966-99 and USDA, National 
Agrricultural Statistics Service, June Agricultural Survey for the years 2000-16.”). 
Percent of Planted Acres 
75 
100 
50 
25 
0 
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 
HT Soybeans
HT Cotton
Bt Corn 
HT Corn
Bt Cotton
2017] On Mandatory Labeling 1071 
nutritional value and greater resistance to herbicides (requiring less use of 
pesticides) but also improved texture and taste.98 GM food is often engineered 
for longer shelf-life, furthering the reach of shipping fresh food.99 For example, 
the Innate potato has been engineered to prevent bruising and browning, as 
well as to reduce the amount of the possible-carcinogen acrylamide released 
when the potato is fried.100 
The most famous nutritional supplementation may be Golden Rice, a 
variety engineered to provide vitamin A.101 In hopes of combatting protein 
malnutrition, cereals such as maize, canola, and soybean have been engineered 
for greater amounts of lysine, an essential amino acid.102 Some products are 
alternatives to unhealthy foods, such as the sweet protein brazzein, developed 
in maize as an alternative sweetener to unhealthy sugar.103 Scientists have also 
been able to reduce the harmful effects of food products, in one instance 
isolating proteins that cause allergic reactions in the development of a 
hypoallergenic peanut.104 In addition, GM foods have been engineered to act 
 
98 See Peter Celec et al., Biological and Biomedical Aspects of Genetically Modified Food, 59 
BIOMEDICINE & PHARMACOTHERAPY 531, 532-33 (2005) (discussing the potential for genes to 
“improve[] flavor characteristics,” “increase [the] nutritional status of the foods,” and confer higher food 
quality such as “shelf-life, taste, [and] nutritional value.”). 
99 See id.  
100 See Andrew Pollack, U.S.D.A. Approves Modified Potato. Next Up: French Fry Fans, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 7, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/08/business/genetically-modified-potato-from-simplot-
approved-by-usda.html [https://perma.cc/46FK-TXF8] (“The potato’s DNA has been altered so that 
less of a chemical called acrylamide, which is suspected of causing cancer in people, is produced 
when the potato is fried. The new potato also resists bruising . . . .”). 
101 See Xudong Ye et al., Engineering the Provitamin A (ß-Carotene) Biosynthetic Pathway into 
(Carotenoid-Free) Rice Endosperm, 287 SCIENCE 303, 303 (2000) (discussing how genetically engineered 
rice can combat vitamin A deficiency); see also Robert E. Black et al., Maternal and Child Undernutrition 
and Overweight in Low-Income and Middle-Income Countries, 382 LANCET 427, 433 (2013) (finding Vitamin 
A deficiencies to be responsible for 157,000 deaths of those aged 5 years and younger in 2011). 
102 See Martina Newell-McGloughlin, Nutritionally Improved Agricultural Crops, 147 PLANT 
PHYSIOLOGY 939, 940 tbl.I (2008), http://www.plantphysiol.org/content/147/3/939.full.pdf+htm [https://
perma.cc/4W33-FZ8V] (listing canola, maize, and soybeans as crops with high “Lys”). Newell-McGloughlin 
provides an overview of techniques and products of GM nutritional supplementing—with carbohydrates, 
fiber, vitamins, and more—as well as for reduced antinutrients, allergens, and toxins. 
103 See Barry J. Lamphear et al., Expression of the Sweet Protein Brazzein in Maize for Production 
of a New Commercial Sweetener, 3 PLANT BIOTECHNOLOGY J. 103, 109 (2005) (reporting on “the use 
of a maize expression system for the economical production of the intensely sweet protein, brazzein, 
for both low- and high-intensity sweetener markets”). 
104 See Hortense W. Dodo et al., Alleviating Peanut Allergy Using Genetic Engineering: The Silencing 
of the Immunodominant Allergen Ara h 2 Leads To Its Significant Reduction and a Decrease in Peanut 
Allergenicity, 6 PLANT BIOTECHNOLOGY J. 135, 140 (2007) (reporting that the study produced “a 
significant reduction in the level of Ara h 2, the most immunodominant peanut allergen”); see also 
Steven Novella, CRISPR and a Hypoallergenic Peanut, NEUROLOGICA BLOG (Oct. 8, 2015), http://
theness.com/neurologicablog/index.php/crispr-and-a-hypoallergenic-peanut/ [https://perma.cc/RRJ3-
S9KB] (“In 2005 a study was published showing that it is possible to silence the gene for the Ara 
H2 protein, the primary allergenic protein in peanuts. A 2008 follow up by the same team showed 
decreased allergenicity of the altered peanut.”). 
1072 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 165: 1043 
as inexpensive vaccines; for example, Applied Biotechnology Institute has 
developed a hepatitis B vaccine in maize.105 It remains possible, of course, 
that techniques will be developed to produce the relevant benefits with 
greatly reduced reliance on GMOs, especially in wealthy nations. 
3. Health 
With respect to safety, the consensus of the scientific community seems 
unambiguous: GM foods do not present health risks.106 In 2012, the American 
Association for the Advancement of Science summarized the consensus, 
writing that “[t]he World Health Organization, the American Medical 
Association, the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, the British Royal 
Society, and every other respected organization that has examined the 
evidence has come to the same conclusion: consuming foods containing 
ingredients derived from GM crops is no riskier than consuming the same 
 
105 See Celine A. Hayden et al., Oral Delivery of Wafers Made from HBsAg-expressing Maize Germ 
Induces Long-term Immunological Systemic and Mucosal Responses, 33 VACCINE 2881, 2885 (2015) (reporting 
that “evidence for long-term efficacy . . . [and] safety of of oral administration of the wafers”); see also 
Celine A. Hayden et al., Production of Highly Concentrated, Heat-Stable Hepatitis B Surface Antigen in 
Maize, PLANT BIOTECHNOLOGY J. 979, 984 (2012) (reporting the results of further studies); Celine 
A. Hayden et al., Bioencapsulation of the Hepatitis B Surface Antigen and Its Use as an Effective Oral 
Immunogen, 30 VACCINE 2937, 2940-42 (2012) (same). 
106 See Fred H. Degnan, Biotechnology and the Food Label, in LABELING GENETICALLY 
MODIFIED FOOD, supra note 6, at 17, 17 (discussing “the FDA’s science-backed conclusion that, as 
a general rule, there is nothing inherently unsafe or mysterious about food biotechnology”). For a 
more recent overview, see U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: VOLUNTARY 
LABELING INDICATING WHETHER FOODS HAVE OR HAVE NOT BEEN DERIVED FROM 
GENETICALLY ENGINEERED PLANTS (Nov. 2015), http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation
/GuidanceDocumentsRegulatoryInformation/LabelingNutrition/ucm059098.htm [https://perma.cc
/YY79-H86J] [hereinafter VOLUNTARY GMO LABELING GUIDANCE], stating, 
In the 1992 Policy, FDA stated that it was not aware of any information showing that 
bioengineered foods differ from other foods in any meaningful or uniform way, or 
that, as a class, foods developed by the new techniques present any different or greater 
safety concern than foods developed by traditional plant breeding . . . . Further, FDA 
concluded that the method of development of a new plant variety (including the use 
of new techniques such as rDNA technology) is generally not material information 
within the meaning of section 201(n) of the FD&C Act, and would not usually be 
required to be disclosed in the labeling for the food. This determination was reviewed 
and upheld by the court in Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F. Supp. 2d 166, 178–
79 (D.D.C. 2000) (finding that FDA’s determination that genetic engineering, alone, 
is not a material fact that warrants food labeling was entitled to deference) 
. . . . Labeling provided by manufacturers on a wholly voluntary basis regarding 
whether a food was or was not bioengineered as described in this guidance is 
acceptable to FDA, provided that such labeling is truthful and not misleading. Some 
consumers are interested in the information provided in such labeling. 
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foods containing ingredients from crop plants modified by conventional plant 
improvement techniques.”107 
In 2016, the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 
issued a book-length report,108 strongly reaffirming what American and 
European scientists have long found: food from GM crops is no more 
dangerous to eat than food produced by conventional agriculture.109 In the 
words of the report, there is “no substantiated evidence” that genetic 
modification of crops produces less safe foods.110 In the United States, Canada, 
the United Kingdom, and Western Europe, “no differences have been found 
that implicate a higher risk to human health safety” from genetically 
engineered foods.111 In its summary, the report states, 
On the basis of its detailed examination of comparisons between currently 
commercialized GE and non-GE foods in compositional analysis, acute and 
chronic animal toxicity tests, long-term data on health of livestock fed GE 
foods, and epidemiological data, the committee concluded that no differences 
have been found that implicate a higher risk to human health safety from 
these GE foods than from their non-GE counterparts.112 
This conclusion tracks that of many others. In 2015, the American 
Association for the Advancement of Science spoke unequivocally. In its 
words, “The science is quite clear: crop improvement by the modern 
molecular techniques of biotechnology is safe.”113 The European Commission 
has similarly proclaimed, 
The main conclusion to be drawn from the efforts of more than 130 research 
projects, covering a period of more than 25 years of research and involving 
more than 500 independent research groups, is that biotechnology, and in 
 
107 AM. ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCI., STATEMENT BY THE AAAS BOARD OF 
DIRECTORS ON LABELING OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS (2012), http://www.aaas.org/sites
/default/files/AAAS_GM_statement.pdf [https://perma.cc/J7E4-NBDE]; see also id. (“[T]he science 
is quite clear: crop improvement by the modern molecular techniques of biotechnology is safe.”). 
108 See NAT’L ACADS. OF SCI., ENG’G, & MED., GENETICALLY ENGINEERED CROPS: 
EXPERIENCES AND PROSPECTS 10 (2016) [hereinafter GENETICALLY ENGINEERED CROPS REPORT]. 
109 See id. 
110 Id. at xvii. 
111 Id. at 10; see also Labeling of Foods Derived from Genetically Engineered Plants, U.S. FOOD & 
DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Food/IngredientsPackagingLabeling/GEPlants/ucm346858.htm 
[https://perma.cc/B4RC-LP7R] (last updated Jan. 18, 2017) (“[T]he agency is not aware of any 
information showing that foods derived from genetically engineered plants, as a class, differ from 
other foods in any meaningful or uniform way. These foods also don’t present different or greater 
safety concerns than their non-genetically engineered counterparts.”). 
112 GENETICALLY ENGINEERED CROPS REPORT, supra note 108, at 10. 
113 Am. Ass’n for the Advancement of Sci., Statement by the AAAS Board of Directors on 
Labeling of Genetically Modified Foods (Oct. 20, 2012), http://www.aaas.org/sites/default/files/AAAS
_GM_statement.pdf [https://perma.cc/3FFK-7QQG]. 
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particular GMOs, are not per se more risky than e.g. conventional plant 
breeding technologies.114 
The World Health Organization, the National Academy of Sciences, and 
the Royal Society in the United Kingdom are in agreement. 
4. Ecology and the Environment 
There would also be an argument for labeling if GMOs created ecological 
risks, rather than dangers to human health. Here the answer is far less 
unambiguous. The 2016 report of the National Academies of Sciences, 
Engineering, and Medicine finds no clear evidence that GM crops cause 
environmental harm.115 At the same time, the report is written with 
considerable caution.116 It does acknowledge the importance of continuing 
monitoring, but pointedly declines to embrace the widespread view that those 
crops have been responsible for declines in monarch butterfly populations.117 
Other studies are less equivocal, finding no special risks to the environment 
from GM agriculture. The American Medical Association has endorsed this 
general view.118 
It must be acknowledged that in some circles, the prevailing scientific 
judgments are intensely disputed.119 Some people believe that with respect to 
both health and the environment, the scientific consensus is influenced by 
 
114 Ioannis Economidis et al., A Decade of EU-Funded GMO Research (2001-2010), in EUROPEAN 
COMM’N, A DECADE OF EU-FUNDED GMO RESEARCH (2001-2010) 15, 16 (2010), https://ec.europa.eu/
research/biosociety/pdf/a_decade_of_eu-funded_gmo_research.pdf [https://perma.cc/RL8J-AAFK]. 
115 See NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., GENETICALLY ENGINEERED CROPS: EXPERIENCES AND 
PROSPECTS 8 (2016), https://agbiotech.ces.ncsu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/NAS-Genetically-
Engineered-Crops-Summary.pdf?fwd=no [https://perma.cc/3Q6U-LCM8] (“Overall, the committee found 
no conclusive evidence of cause-and-effect relationships between GE crops and environmental problems.”). 
116 See id. (“However, the complex nature of assessing long-term environmental changes often 
made it difficult to reach definitive conclusions.”). 
117 See id. (stating that studies of of monarch populations “have not shown that suppression of 
milkweed by glyphosate is the cause of monarch decline”). 
118 See COUNCIL ON SCI. & PUB. HEALTH, LABELING OF BIOENGINEERED FOODS 2 (2012) 
(“Bioengineered foods have been consumed for close to 20 years, and during that time, no overt 
consequences on human health have been reported and/or substantiated in the peer-reviewed literature.”). 
119 For example, a collaborative study of statisticians, philosophers, and physicists noted, 
[GMOs] are categorically and statistically different from [evolutionary modifications 
to ecological systems]. . . . [Those systems] enabl[e] the push and pull of the ecosystem 
to locally extinguish harmful mutations. [GMOs] bypass this evolutionary pathway 
[and] unintentionally manipulate large sets of inter-dependent factors at the same 
time, with dramatic risks of unintended consequences . . . . They thus . . . place a huge 
risk on the food system as a whole. 
Nassim Nicholas Taleb et al., The Precautionary Principle (with Application to the Genetic Modification 
of Organisms) 10 (Extreme Risk Initiative—NYU Sch. of Eng’g Working Paper Series, 2014), http://
www.fooledbyrandomness.com/pp2.pdf [https://perma.cc/66NY-972V]. 
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powerful private interest groups, which have an interest in denying both 
health and environmental concerns.120 In their view, any such consensus is not 
trustworthy; they do not necessarily disbelieve that scientists are unconcerned, 
but they offer a second-order reason to discount that lack of concern. With 
respect to environmental risks in particular, a number of observers point to 
what they see as a series of ecological risks, including toxicity to nontarget 
organisms (such as butterflies and bees), invasiveness in natural settings, and 
threats to biodiversity.121 Some scientists and regulators have also expressed 
grave concern that if they are widespread, GMOs will lead to resistance and 
the loss of a “public good”—susceptibility of insect pests to certain proteins.122 
It should be acknowledged that some people fear long-term effects, not only 
ecological in nature, but also cultural and distributional, including the effects 
of GM products on small farmers. It is hardly impossible that over time, their 
concerns will be vindicated. For present purposes, the central point is that the 
prevailing scientific judgment appears to be that the health risks are 
nonexistent and that the standard environmental concerns are highly 
conjectural and have not been demonstrated to be serious. 
5. Risk–Risk Tradeoffs 
It should be clear in this light that if GM labels are effective in changing 
consumer behavior, there could well be a risk–risk tradeoff. On one view, such 
labels might help diminish ecological risks. At the same time, they might 
increase risks to health and to the environment. Longer shelf lives save 
 
120 See, e.g., Tim Schwab, Pro-GMO Database: Monsanto Is the Most Common Funder of GMO Research, 
FOOD & WATER WATCH (Sept. 16, 2014), http://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/insight/pro-gmo-database
-monsanto-most-common-funder-gmo-research [https://perma.cc/EV6K-FR7Q] (“The fact that authors 
[of scientific research showing GMOs are safe] are not disclosing all sources of funding (and conflicts 
of interest) presents an obvious avenue for biased research to enter the scientific discourse.”). 
121 See, e.g., Emily Glass, The Environmental Impact of GMOs, ONE GREEN PLANET (Aug. 2, 
2013), http://www.onegreenplanet.org/animalsandnature/the-environmental-impact-of-gmos/ [https://
perma.cc/K23Z-Y7YD] (“GMOs may be toxic to non-target organisms, [including] bees and butterflies 
. . . . [T]here is potential for GMO’s . . . to become invasive species in delicate, natural ecosystems. . . . 
[B]iodiversity . . . is put at risk by GMOS.”). For a good overview of the science on GMOs and the 
environment, see MCHUGHEN, supra note 7, at 137-59. For a deeper look into the risks posed by 
GMOs to biodiversity, see WORLD CONSERVATION UNION, CURRENT KNOWLEDGE OF THE 
IMPACTS OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED ORGANISMS ON BIODIVERSITY AND HUMAN HEALTH 
22-31 (2007), https://cmsdata.iucn.org/downloads/ip_gmo_09_2007_1_.pdf [https://perma.cc/YH5P
-UEJP], which discusses habitat change, pollution, invasive alien species, and risk management; and 
Heather Landry, Challenging Evolution: How GMOs Can Influence Genetic Diversity, HARV. U.: SCI.  NEWS 
(Aug. 10, 2015), http://sitn.hms.harvard.edu/flash/2015/challenging-evolution-how-gmos-can-influence-
genetic-diversity/ [https://perma.cc/6J5R-WV7N], which notes, “Although there is little evidence that 
GMOs have impacted genetic diversity in today’s environment, scientists and ecologists are very 
aware of the potential influence that GMOs have on biodiversity.” 
122 See Sarah L. Bates et al., Insect Resistance Management in GM Crops: Past, Present and Future, 
23 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 57, 58 (2005) (discussing mandated monitoring of GMO resistance). 
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resources, and GM food reduces use of pesticides, which create hazards of their 
own.123 The point is not to reach a final judgment about the magnitude of these 
effects, but to signal the fact that risks are not only on one side of the equation. 
B. What People Want, and Why 
1. Labels for Health? 
The public opinion evidence is at least as clear as the science: people do not 
believe that GM food is safe, and they strongly favor mandatory labels. It is 
not easy to find a domain in which public opinion is so unambiguously at odds 
with the scientific consensus. A typical survey finds that only 37% of Americans 
believe that GM food is safe to eat (as compared with 88% of members of the 
American Association for the Advancement of Science).124 According to my 
own recent survey, 86% of Americans favor labeling of GM food—89% of 
Democrats, 80% of Republicans, and 87% of independents.125 
What explains such high levels of support for mandatory labels? The 
simplest answer is that people favor labels because they think that GM food 
is harmful, and they believe that consumers should be allowed to make an 
informed choice about whether to consume it.126 To that extent, the judgment 
in favor of labels for GM food is quite similar to the corresponding judgment 
with respect to products that contain high levels of salt or that otherwise are 
taken to create health risks.127 Without carefully engaging with questions 
about costs and benefits, people make an intuitive judgment that government 
should mandate labels in order to allow consumers to avoid, if they wish, 
products that might be dangerous. 
 
123 See WORLD CONSERVATION UNION, supra note 121, at 7 (“Proponents for GM claim . . . 
production can be enhanced while indirectly reducing environmental impacts, for example, through 
less use of pesticides or fertilizers.”). 
124 Scott et al., Evidence for Absolute Moral Opposition to Genetically Modified Food in the United 
States, 11 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 316, 317 (2016). 
125 See Sunstein, supra note 17, at 12 tbl.3. 
126 See Why Label It?, JUST LABEL IT, http://www.justlabelit.org/right-to-know-center/right-
to-know/ [http://perma.cc/44BA-M3CP] (“While our reasons for wanting to know what’s in our food 
may vary, what unifies us is the belief that it’s our right.”).  
127 See Sunstein, supra note 17, at 189 (finding “strong majority support (73 percent) for a 
mandatory warning label on products that have unusually high levels of salt”). Similar findings have 
been made in Europe. See Lucia A. Reisch & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Europeans Like Nudges?, 11 
JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 310, 316 fig.2 (2016) (showing 69-90% support for government 
mandated labels of foods containing high levels of salt across different European countries). 
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2. Disgust and Naturalness 
On the basis of existing research, the simplest answer appears to be 
correct, but Sydney Scott, Paul Rozin, and Yoel Inbar offer some important 
and illuminating complications.128 Scott et al. asked a representative sample of 
Americans whether they supported or opposed genetically engineering plants 
and animals.129 The authors also asked respondents to register agreement or 
disagreement with the statement, “This should be prohibited no matter how 
great the benefits and minor the risks from allowing it.”130 
Consistent with previous studies, 64% of participants opposed genetic 
engineering.131 In fact, 71% of the opponents—46% of the entire sample—were 
absolutists: they want to ban genetic engineering regardless of the benefits and 
risks.132 To that extent, their opposition to GM foods is not consequentialist or 
based on an assessment of costs and benefits at all. To explain the psychology 
behind that apparently puzzling finding, Scott and her coauthors presented 
their participants with a scenario in which a random person ends up eating GM 
tomatoes (either knowingly or unknowingly).133 They asked people how angry 
or disgusted they were when imagining the scenario.134 Opponents of genetic 
modification were angrier and more disgusted than its supporters,135 but the 
absolutists were especially disgusted.136 Controlling for demographic and other 
differences, Scott et al. found that “[d]isgust was the best predictor” of whether 
people would proclaim absolute opposition to genetic modification.137 
The authors’ conclusion is simple: People who most strongly oppose 
genetic modification are not weighing consequences.138 Their opposition is a 
product of the fact that they find the idea disgusting.139 
That claim requires its own exploration. By itself, the idea of GM food 
does not seem to be the sort that would trigger disgust; it is not as if we are 
speaking of bodily fluids or the ordinary sources of something like nausea.140 
 
128 See Scott et al., supra note 124, at 316-17 (studying “the roles of disgust and moral absolutism 
in Americans’ attitudes toward genetically modified food”). 
129 See id. at 17 (describing the questions posed to participants). 
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
133 See id. at 317-18 (describing the “tomato scenarios”). 
134 Id. at 317. 
135 See id. at 318 (reporting higher levels of disgust and anger among GMO opponents). 
136 Id.  
137 Id. 
138 See id. at 317 (noting that most individuals who oppose GM foods are “moral absolutists” 
because they “would maintain their opposition regardless of consequences”). 
139 See id. at 320 (“GM opponents, especially absolutist opponents, tend to feel heightened 
disgust, both generally and regarding the consumption of genetically modified foods specifically.”). 
140 See Paul Rozin & April E. Fallon, A Perspective on Disgust, 94 PSYCHOL. REV. 23, 23 (1987) 
(“Like other basic emotions, disgust has a characteristic facial expression . . . , an appropriate action 
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In this context, disgust would seem to be a placeholder for some kind of 
intense emotion, signaling disapproval. We might speculate that many people 
have an immediate, intuitive sense that what is healthy is what is “natural,”141 
and that efforts to tamper with nature will inevitably unleash serious risks—
so-called Frankenfoods.142 
This speculation raises two puzzles of its own. First, we might question 
whether and to what extent people really are absolutists about GM food. It is 
one thing to say, in the abstract, that GM foods should be regulated or banned 
regardless of the benefits and risks. It is another thing to favor regulation or 
prohibition after receiving concrete information about benefits and risks. If, 
for example, people are asked to assume that GM food reduces costs by 20% 
or promises to save thousands of lives annually, and that it poses no risks to 
health or to the environment, would they really favor regulation or 
prohibition? Many of those who purport to be absolutists in the abstract or 
in response to general questions tend to become more consequentialist, and 
more amenable to some form of cost–benefit balancing, when they are 
presented with concrete numbers.143 
Second, it is not obvious how regulators should respond to regulatory 
intuitions of the kind that existing surveys seem to capture. If people are 
using a heuristic (“unnatural is unsafe”), and if that heuristic is producing an 
error (“GM food is unsafe”), then regulators should correct the error so that 
consumers can make informed decisions. But if consumers are simply 
disgusted, then they are registering a taste, not an erroneous judgment. 
Consider a purer case of disgust: Some people are disgusted by Jello.144 (I 
 
(distancing of the self from an offensive object), a distinctive physiological manifestation (nausea), 
and a characteristic feeling state (revulsion).”). 
141 See, e.g., DIETER BIRNBACHER, NATURALNESS: IS THE “NATURAL” PREFERABLE TO THE 
“ARTIFICIAL”? 23 (David Carus trans., 2014) (noting that “as long as [the source of a risk] is nature, 
risks are more readily tolerated than when they come from anthropogenic sources”); JAMES P. 
COLLMAN, NATURALLY DANGEROUS: SURPRISING FACTS ABOUT FOOD, HEALTH, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT 31 (2001) (noting that Americas are willing to pay more for organic food “because 
they believe that such food is safer, healthier, and more friendly to the environment”); Fern (Mai 
Mai) Lin, The Impact of Naturalness on Perceived Risk 1 (Spring 2009) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://opim.wharton.upenn.edu/risk/ackoff/Ackoff2009/Lin2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/7YK5-XKUY] 
(“There are indications, however, that in the Western world, people have begun to associate 
naturalness with reduced risk.”). 
142 See Michelle Schoffro Cook, Top 20 Frankenfoods to Avoid, CARE2 (Sept. 12, 2013), http://www.
care2.com/greenliving/top-20-frankenfoods-to-avoid.html [https://perma.cc/9NJY-Z53D] (listing the top 
twenty “foods and food ingredients [to avoid] to make your body GM-free”). 
143 See Jonathan Baron & Sarah Leshner, How Serious Are Expressions of Protected Values?, 6 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 183, 192 (2000) (noting that individuals “will accept actions 
that violate [their protected values] if the probability or amount of the harm is small relative to the 
probability and magnitude of benefit”). 
144 See Jell-O, Why Are You So Gross?: A Dear John Letter, HUFFINGTON POST: TASTE (Oct. 1, 
2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/04/gross-jello-hate-jiggle_n_3378066.html [https://perma.
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confess that I am among them.) They can decide to avoid Jello. But should 
regulators mandate labels in the face of such a taste (“This product contains 
Jello”)? Even if no health issues are involved? In such circumstances, there 
would not seem to be a compelling argument for mandatory labeling (to say 
the least). I will return to these issues shortly. 
C. GMO Labels: Normative Considerations 
1. Market Failure 
With respect to GM food, is there a market failure, behavioral or 
otherwise? Consumers can, of course, refuse to purchase GM food—if they 
know that that is what it is. And if consumers care, we should see a degree of 
market sorting, in which some companies label their foods as not containing 
GMOs; some companies acknowledge that their foods contain GMOs; and 
some companies are silent.145 In fact, that is exactly what the American market 
has observed, with the help of FDA guidance on the matter.146 Where, then, 
is the market failure justifying the disclosure mandate? The Department of 
Agriculture will be required to give some kind of answer to that question.147 
Consistent with the previous discussion, one response points to behavioral 
science. Even though some people will infer that food without a “GMO-free” 
label does in fact contain GMOs, many will not. Most consumers are not 
thinking about GMOs at all when they are purchasing food. And even though 
most consumers support GMO labeling in surveys,148 the issue probably lacks 
much salience when people are making choices at restaurants or grocery stores.149 
An alternative argument for a market failure involves the environmental 
consequences, which amount to third-party effects.150 If GM foods pose 
 
cc/4B9L-GFSQ] (“Jell-O is the smelly kid of desserts and the only reason it’s still around is because 
kids haven’t yet learned any better.”). 
145 See supra Section I.A. (describing the process of market unraveling that leads to voluntary 
disclosure of the relevant ingredient by producers). 
146 See VOLUNTARY GMO LABELING GUIDANCE, supra note 106 (“Labeling provided by 
manufacturers on a wholly voluntary basis regarding whether a food was or was not bioengineered as 
described in this guidance is acceptable to FDA, provided that such labeling is truthful and not misleading.”). 
147 See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text. 
148 See supra text accompanying note 125. 
149 But see Wallace E. Huffman et al., Consumer Willingness to Pay for Genetically Modified Food Labels 
in a Market with Diverse Information: Evidence from Experimental Auctions, 28 J. AGRIC. & RESOURCE 
ECON. 481, 497 (2003) (concluding that “consumers’ willingness to pay for a food product decreases 
when the food label indicates the food product is genetically modified”). 
150 See Benoit Morel et al., Pesticide Resistance, the Precautionary Principle, and the Regulation of 
Bt Corn: Real Option and Rational Option Approaches to Decisionmaking (proposing option theory as an 
analytical framework for the precautionary principle and applying that framework to the issue of 
commercializing Bt corn), in BATTLING RESISTANCE TO ANTIBIOTICS AND PESTICIDES 184, 184-85, 
192-202 (Ramanan Laxminarayan ed., 2003); Justus Wesseler, Resistance Economics of Transgenic Crops 
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nontrivial environmental risks, or even if they merely might do so, labeling can 
be seen as a legitimate way of reducing the relevant risks. A label based on third-
party effects would seem unobjectionable in principle, even though, as noted, a 
disclosure mandate is not the preferred way to counteract such effects.151 
2. Costs and Benefits 
Some people argue that they have a “right to know” what they are eating.152 
On this view, consumers are entitled to be informed about the ingredients in 
their food—salt, sugar, fat, or GMOs. The initial answer to this suggestion is 
that there is no freestanding “right” to mandatory labels, simply because 
some, or even many, consumers would favor them. Unless there is a market 
failure of some kind, the market provides the knowledge to which consumers 
have a right.153 We have explored some reasons why there might be a market 
failure here.154 The second answer is that even in the face of an actual market 
failure, whether consumers have a right to know, in the form of a mandatory 
label, depends on the costs and the benefits.155 
a. Costs 
To assess costs, the USDA must begin by projecting the costs of labeling 
itself. The projection is likely to be disputed,156 but it does not present serious 
conceptual difficulties; the only issues are ones of fact. As we have also seen, 
there are costs as well to consumers who see the label (and are less happy 
when they do) and also to consumers who, having seen the label, buy goods 
that are either more costly or inferior (the lost consumer surplus).157 
 
Under Uncertainty: A Real Option Approach (discussing pest resistance as an irreversible cost of transgenic 
crops), in BATTLING RESISTANCE TO ANTIBIOTICS AND PESTICIDES, supra, at 214, 214-18; see also 
Taleb et al., supra note 119, at 9-11 (discussing potential risks of GMOs and exploring reasons to be 
precautionary with respect to them). 
151 For more information about the idea of “mismatch” between market failure and regulatory tools, 
see BREYER, supra note 24, at 195, which explains that “identify[ing] a mismatch . . . involves finding an 
area where the regulatory process is particularly likely to cause significant anticompetitive harm.” 
152 See, e.g., Why Label It?, supra note 126 (“While our reasons for wanting to know what’s in 
our food may vary, what unifies us is the belief that it’s our right.”). 
153 See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text. 
154 See supra subsection II.C.1. 
155 See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text. It follows that the welfarist approach of the 
“right to know” asks whether mandatory disclosure passes some kind of cost–benefit test. On some of 
the complexities with the idea of welfare, see generally ADLER, supra note 65. Some of those complexities 
bear on important regulatory problems—as when a regulation that fails cost–benefit analysis has desirable 
distributional consequences—but for GM foods, important distributional consequences do not seem to 
arise and so can be fairly bracketed. 
156 See supra Section I.B. (discussing the difficulties of quantifying the costs and benefits of 
labeling requirements). 
157 See supra subsection I.B.1.d. 
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The latter costs will be extremely difficult to specify, and the USDA might 
be forced to produce some upper or lower bound, or even to say that those 
costs are not quantifiable. It might also be reasonable for the USDA to 
conclude that those costs are unlikely to be large. Merely seeing the label 
would not impose high costs on consumers.158 To project the lost consumer 
surplus, agencies would need to project the likely effect of the label on 
consumer behavior and the monetized loss. Undertaking that projection 
might well turn out to be daunting, even impossible, and the agency might 
be unable to produce specific numbers or even a reasonably bounded range. 
b. Millions of Labels, in Search of Benefits 
If we focus, as agencies frequently do, on health benefits from mandatory 
labels, GM labels would seem to be difficult to defend. As we have seen, the 
health benefits appear to be zero,159 and so they are not sufficient to justify 
even modest costs. We have also seen that, on one view, environmental 
benefits cannot be ruled out, but on the basis of the existing science, they are 
probably impossible to quantify.160 I will return to that issue; for the moment, 
the simple conclusion is that it would not be so easy to argue that the 
environmental benefits of labels would justify a significant expenditure.161 
In this respect, agencies would have a difficult challenge using their 
conventional approach to benefit estimates to justify the conclusion that 
mandatory labeling would survive a cost–benefit test, as required by Executive 
Orders 12866 and 13563.162 As compared to the case of calorie labeling, for 
example, it would be hard to specify health or environmental endpoints, or even 
ranges, that could make their way into a conventional regulatory impact analysis. 
c. Options 
Confronted with this problem, the USDA has several options. First, it 
might simply announce that the benefits of GM labels are not quantifiable. 
As we have seen, agencies have taken that route in the past, and it has survived 
 
158 See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
159 See supra subsection II.A.3. 
160 See supra subsection II.A.4. 
161 But see Taleb et al., supra note 119, at 9-11 (arguing that GMOs pose risks that are worth 
taking quite seriously). 
162 See supra notes 1–2 and 11. Of course, the existing requirements apply only “to the extent 
permitted by law,” meaning that, under a mandatory labeling law, agencies would be required to proceed 
even if the benefits did not justify the costs. See supra note 15. Nonetheless, it is awkward for an agency 
to announce that it is proceeding in the face of costs that greatly exceed benefits—though it has 
happened. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 71, at 201 n.27 (2014) (noting that it is “exceedingly rare . . . for an 
agency to proceed when the monetized costs exceed the monetized benefits”). 
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judicial scrutiny, at least under statutes that require agencies to act.163 The 
problem with this approach is that when agencies have previously imposed 
disclosure mandates without quantifying benefits, they could usually say that 
they expect significant benefits (in terms of money or health), but could only 
speculate about their magnitude.164 If the expectation of significant benefits 
is reasonable, a failure to quantify may not be objectionable, at least if 
quantification is not feasible. 
In this context, by contrast, the problem is that there would seem to be 
no benefits at all (bracketing the question of environmental harm, to which I 
will return). When benefits are in the general range of zero, it is not enough, 
or even reasonable, to say that they are speculative. Because the statute 
requires the USDA to act,165 the inability to project benefits is unlikely to be 
objectionable purely as a matter of law, but it does require serious challenges 
for the agency when it attempts to produce a regulatory impact analysis and 
to survive scrutiny within the executive branch. 
The closest analogy may well be the conflict minerals controversy, where 
the SEC was not able to project benefits and candidly confessed to that fact.166 
Because GM labels are required by law, such a confession would likely be 
enough to survive judicial review, but it would encounter hard questions under 
the process of OIRA review. 
Faced with that problem, the USDA might engage in some form of 
breakeven analysis, especially if the costs of mandatory GM labels can be 
described as low.167 We can easily imagine creative efforts in this vein, asking 
(for example) about whether it would be worthwhile to charge the average 
American $X annually (where $X is very little) in return for GM labels.168 
Suppose, for example, that the cost of a label is $2.30 per person per year.169 
 
163 See supra note 47. 
164 Id. 
165 See supra note 10. 
166 See supra note 47. 
167 For one estimate, see JOHN DUNHAM, COST IMPACT OF VERMONT’S GMO LABELING 
LAW ON CONSUMERS NATIONWIDE 2 (2016), http://corn.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Cost-Impact
-of-Vermont’s-GMO-Labeling-Law-on-Consumers-Nationwide.pdf [https://perma.cc/6NBC-4MVV], 
which “conclude[d] that the one-time cost to consumers as a result of the [Vermont GMO] labeling 
requirement w[ould] be as high as $3.8 billion.” 
168 The Department of Justice used a similar approach to justify renovations in the context of 
building accessibility. See Sunstein, supra note 48, at 1401-02 (describing the Department’s method of using 
a breakeven analysis to frame $32.6 million in costs to replace bathroom doors as only $0.05-$2.20 per use). 
169 See Memorandum from Andrew Dyke & Robert Whelan, ECONorthwest, to Consumers 
Union 1 (Sept. 12, 2014), https://consumersunion.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/GMO_labeling
_cost_findings_Exe_Summ.pdf [https://perma.cc/3ZLS-YAQA] (finding that the median estimated 
cost of mandatory labeling is $2.30 per person per year). With the flexibility of the national law 
permitting compliance with the use of bar codes, see supra note 5, the costs should be significantly 
lower than they would otherwise be. However, the $2.30 figure, produced by an interested party, 
might not be credible. 
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It might well be suggested that the mandate obviously survives breakeven 
analysis. Isn’t that modest cost worth incurring, given widespread consumer 
preference for labels and good-faith concerns about ecological risks? Perhaps so. But 
one problem is that on the assumption about the per person cost, the 
aggregate cost is over $700 million—hardly a trivial amount.170 It would be 
easy, and misleading, to say that any annual $700 million expenditure is 
justified because, for all Americans, the annual per person cost is merely $2.30. 
The real question is what people are obtaining for that $700 million. 
As an independent method of valuation, or as part of some breakeven 
analysis, it might seem reasonable to put a spotlight on consumers’ willingness-to-
pay for GM labels. On the basis of survey evidence suggesting that consumers 
favor such labels, 171 it would not be implausible to think that the amount would 
be significant population-wide—and per person, at least $2.30 per year. Ideally, 
regulators would have some evidence of people’s willingness-to-pay, which they 
could compare with some estimate of costs. In the absence of such evidence, 
they might nonetheless engage in breakeven analysis. 
Would an approach of that kind be sufficient to ground a reasonable cost–
benefit analysis under prevailing executive orders? At first glance, it should be, 
but as we shall now see, any approach of that kind turns out to raise some 
quite fundamental questions about regulatory policy. 
d. What Consumers Want 
We can easily imagine cases in which the law should not mandate labels 
even if consumers would be willing to pay for them. Suppose, for example, 
that consumers want to know whether African-Americans or Jews were 
involved in the production of some commodity. To the extent that the 
consumer demand reflected racism or prejudice, it should not be honored. 
But the call for GM labels does not run afoul of this principle, because no 
invidious discrimination is involved. 
Consider a more relevant comparison: Suppose that consumers are 
alarmed about some ingredient in food—call it Omega P—even though there 
is no reason for alarm. Suppose that there is an online health scare about 
Omega P and that people at least want to know whether the food they are 
eating contains it. In principle, a label is not a good idea. It would cater to 
public ignorance, and it would have no benefits. For government, the right 
response is to inform people that Omega P is, in fact, safe. Note that in this 
case, the standard argument for use of willingness-to-pay is decisively 
undermined. People might be willing to pay something—perhaps even a great 
 
170 This figure was obtained by multiplying a rounded estimate of the population of the United 
States by the $2.30 estimate. 
171 See supra text accompanying note 125. 
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deal—for Omega P labels, but because such labels would not promote their 
welfare, there is no sufficient reason to mandate them. Note in this regard 
that 80% of Americans have been found to favor a label for foods that contain 
DNA (!).172 The challenge for the USDA will be to show that labels for GM 
food are relevantly different from labels for Omega P; perhaps uncertainty 
and irreversibility can help the agency to show relevant distinctions.173 
3. But Morality? 
For some people, arguments about health and the environment miss the 
central points. On one view, the objection to GM foods is theological: GMOs 
tamper with God’s creation.174 On another view, it is moral: there is something 
wrong with treating nature in this way.175 On a third view, GM food benefits 
large corporations and the wealthy at the expense of small farmers, poor 
nations, and the poor in general.176 The third view can easily be translated 
into an argument about adverse effects on third parties. Under all three views, 
GM labels are a modest step in the right direction insofar as they allow 
consumers to know what they are buying and to register their preferences, their 
values, and their commitments. 
At the very least, we should be willing to agree that if labels do have some 
kind of moral motivation, they might be well-justified, even if quantitative 
cost–benefit analysis turns out to be challenging, impossible, or beside the 
point.177 We have seen analogies, in the form of labels designed to prevent 
cruelty to animals. Could GM labels be defended on some similar grounds? 
It should not be sufficient merely to point to the fact of moral concern; the 
question is whether the moral concern has some plausible basis. In the 
 
172 See JAYSON LUSK & SUSAN MURRAY, OKLA. ST. U., FOOD DEMAND SURVEY 4 (2015), 
http://agecon.okstate.edu/faculty/publications/4975.pdf [https://perma.cc/HUF3-BXAQ] (reporting 
that 80% of survey respondents support mandatory labeling of foods that contain DNA). 
173 See supra note 150. 
174 See, e.g., Gena, Comment to Why Did Chobani Change Its Mind on GMOs?, FARMER’S 
DAUGHTER USA (Oct. 16, 2015, 7:28 PM), http://www.thefarmersdaughterusa.com/2014/10/why-did-
chobani-change-its-mind-on-gmos.html [https://perma.cc/NV9V-BSPN] (“HE is always watching and 
HE will not take kindly to the adulteration of the food HE blessed upon us with.”). 
175 See Amy Harmon, A Lonely Quest for Facts on Genetically Modified Crops, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 
4, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/05/us/on-hawaii-a-lonely-quest-for-facts-about-gmos.html 
[https://perma.cc/759E-4DCM] (reporting that one proponent of a bill banning GMO crops from 
being grown in Hawaii “took the microphone ‘on behalf of Mother Earth and all sentient beings’”). 
176 See Opinion, Genetically Modified Food and the Poor, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2003), http://www.
nytimes.com/2003/10/13/opinion/genetically-modified-food-and-the-poor.html [https://perma.cc/B8WK-
929R] (noting that the “[GMO] industry is tightly controlled by five conglomerates” and that “the real 
problem is that genetic engineering is hurting the poor”). 
177 See supra text accompanying note 4; see also Posner & Sunstein, supra note 27, at 4. 
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abstract, an affirmative answer can hardly be ruled out; many people hold 
moral concerns about GM food in good faith.178 
The difficulty is to specify some intelligible moral principle that does in 
fact call for labels. It is not at all clear that there is a plausible religious 
objection to GM foods (and if there were, it could not easily be invoked by the 
Department of Agriculture without raising First Amendment issues). It is hard 
to make sense of the argument that GM foods are “mistreating nature.”179 Nor 
is it clear that GM labels can be plausibly defended on distributional grounds 
in light of the considerable difficulty in demonstrating that GM foods are 
objectionable on such grounds and in showing that even if they are, labels are 
helpful in meeting that challenge.180 But I do not mean to reach a judgment on 
the particulars here—only to suggest the form of a possible justification and 
the serious challenges that the USDA, or anyone else, might face in offering it. 
4. Drawing False Inferences 
There is an additional concern: the signal contained in the mandatory 
label might affirmatively mislead consumers.181 If the government requires 
Omega P labels, many consumers will infer that public officials are worried 
about Omega P and believe that consumers should think carefully before 
consuming food that contains it. Whatever the government is seeking to 
convey, the disclosure might well contain this signal: “Omega P is a legitimate 
cause for concern.” To the extent that public officials provide such a signal, 
they are affirmatively misleading people. Whether the mandate is heard to 
offer that signal is, of course, an empirical question. 
The FDA is plainly concerned with the risk that consumers might be 
misled in this context. In 2015, it noted that 
a statement may be false or misleading if, when considered in the context of 
the entire label or labeling . . . it suggests or implies that a food product or 
 
178 See supra text accompanying note 124. 
179 See MCHUGHEN, supra note 7, at 143 (discussing the moral and ethical concerns some 
people have regarding GMOs). 
180 See id. at 143-44, 213 (discussing socioeconomic concerns related to GMOs and the limitations 
of mandatory labels to remedy those concerns). One possible defense would point to consumers’ 
willingness-to-pay for labels to promote distributional concerns. But as before, the question remains 
whether that fact is sufficient, independent of its basis. Recall also that a distributional argument rests 
on its own; it need not be defended in terms of consumers’ willingness-to-pay. See supra note 53. 
181 See supra note 14; see also Colin A. Carter & Guillaume P. Gruère, Mandatory Labeling of 
Genetically Modified Foods: Does It Really Provide Consumer Choice?, 6 J. AGROBIOTECHNOLOGY MGMT. 
& ECON. 68, 70 (2003) (“Mandatory labeling provides food processors and retailers a choice, but it 
does not facilitate consumer choice. Because of rational food processor decisions, mandatory labeling 
acts as a market barrier, and GM products do not appear at the retail level.”); cf. Charles Noussair et 
al., Do Consumers Really Refuse to Buy Genetically Modified Food?, 114 ECON. J. 102, 113 (2004) (conducting 
an experiment and finding “that the ‘average’ consumer values the absence of GMOs”). 
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ingredient is safer, more nutritious, or otherwise has different attributes than 
other comparable foods because the food was not genetically engineered. For 
example, the labeling of a bag of specific type of frozen vegetables that states 
that they were “not produced through modern biotechnology” could be 
misleading if, in addition to this statement, the labeling contains statements 
or vignettes that suggest or imply that, as a result of not being produced 
through modern biotechnology, such vegetables are safer, more nutritious, or 
have different attributes than other foods solely because the food was not 
produced using modern biotechnology.182 
Some evidence suggests that consumers would indeed draw an inference, 
from a label, that the government believes that GM food is unhealthy.183 In 
one study, “respondents consistently believed that foods labeled GMO are 
less healthy, safe and environmentally-friendly compared to all other labels,” 
suggesting that “a disconnect [may exist] between respondent attitudes 
[toward the label] and the scientific consensus” on GM food.184 Nor is it 
irrational for consumers to infer, from a label, that public officials believe that 
GM foods pose some kind of risk. Ordinarily, labels are required for that 
reason; they are essentially warnings and taken as such. 
In the implementation of the new GM labeling law, we could imagine 
creative responses by the private or public sector. The government might 
allow or require the warnings to be accompanied by a disclaimer: “The FDA 
has determined that GM foods do not pose a health risk of any kind.” Or more 
gently: “The FDA has not determined that GM foods pose a health risk of any 
kind.” Producers of GM foods might be allowed or encouraged to embark on 
an educational campaign offering exactly that message. For fully rational 
consumers, clarifying steps of this kind should correct any misimpression. 
But for many consumers, such steps might not work. On the contrary, 
they might even backfire. In view of public opposition to GM foods, a 
statement to the effect that GM foods “do not carry a health risk” might 
instead focus public attention on the possible association between GM foods 
and the whole idea of health risks. Many consumers might think, “Where 
there is smoke, there is fire; why not buy something else?” Of course, the 
existence and extent of this reaction present empirical questions, but existing 
evidence suggests that many consumers will make a false inference and that 
it will not be easy to correct that inference. 
 
182 VOLUNTARY GMO LABELING GUIDANCE, supra note 106, at 7. 
183 See Bar-Gill et al., supra note 14, at 21 (reporting that survey respondents believed GMO 
disclosure was the product of research finding GM food to be harmful); Joanna K. Sax & Neal 
Doran, Food Labeling and Consumer Associations with Health, Safety and Environment, 44 J.L. MED. & 
ETHICS 630, 631 (2016) (discussing consumer perceptions of mandatory food labels). 
184 Id. at 636. 
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If labels mislead (some or many) people, the issue is not at an end. It is 
necessary to ask what kind of welfare loss that imposes. A key question is 
whether consumers will end up purchasing GMO-free food that is inferior 
along some dimension—say, it is more expensive or less nutritious. If they do 
so, that is a welfare loss, and it may be substantial. 
5. A Summary 
I have covered numerous issues here, and a summary may be useful. With 
respect to costs, the USDA must calculate the expense of producing the labels 
themselves. The calculation will undoubtedly produce some dispute, but the 
analysis should be reasonably straightforward. There are costs to consumers 
who see the label (and are less happy when they do) and also to consumers 
who, having seen the label, buy goods that are more costly or (in their view) 
inferior. The latter costs are more important but will be extremely difficult to 
specify; the USDA might do best simply to say that they are not quantifiable. 
It might be reasonable for the agency to conclude that the costs are unlikely 
to be large, though informed conjecture or (better) evidence would of course 
be necessary to support that conclusion. 
The benefits issue is far more challenging. It is not possible to identify 
health endpoints that would justify mandatory labels. Nor is it simple to 
specify environmental risks or to connect a disclosure mandate to reduction 
of those risks. In principle, the willingness-to-pay figure is the right one, but 
it is highly doubtful that the USDA could produce reliable estimates. Even if 
it did, the numbers might well be a product of consumer errors in the form 
of a mistaken belief that GM foods produce health risks. 
In these circumstances, the USDA will not have an easy time in 
demonstrating that the benefits of mandatory labels justify the costs. As I 
have noted, the law requires the agency to proceed even if it cannot make that 
demonstration, but under prevailing executive orders, no agency likes to 
proceed when costs plainly exceed benefits, and the process of scrutiny within 
the executive branch will produce a serious demand for some kind of plausible 
cost–benefit justification. For the USDA, the best option is probably to offer 
a breakeven analysis, invoking consumers’ wishes, the risk of irreversible 
environmental harm (perhaps with special attention to biodiversity185), or 
both. If the per person cost of labels is indeed very low, a breakeven analysis 
might turn out to be plausible. That claim brings us to our final topic. 
 
185 See MCHUGHEN, supra note 7, at 137-59 (discussing the science on GMOs and the environment). 
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III.  PRECAUTIONS, IRREVERSIBILITY, AND UNCERTAINTY 
When a product or activity creates some kind of risk, even a small one, 
many people argue in favor of precautions, and, in particular, in favor of the 
precautionary principle.186 Some of the central claims on behalf of that 
principle involve uncertainty, learning over time, irreversibility, and the need 
for epistemic humility on the part of scientists. Any consensus might turn out 
to be wrong; today’s assurance might be tomorrow’s red alert.187 In particular, 
GMOs are often thought to trigger the precautionary principle, with special 
emphasis on the need for continued monitoring, residual uncertainty, and 
potentially irreversible188 or catastrophic environmental risks.189 This is no 
mere theoretical point. As one commentator explains, European “legislation 
that governed GMOs used a precautionary approach, and precaution was one 
basis for the de facto moratorium on authorizations of GM varieties.”190 
A. Worst Cases 
Whatever we think about the particular application, the precautionary 
principle has deep roots in international law.191 As long ago as 1982, for 
example, the United Nations World Charter for Nature gave international 
 
186 For general discussion, see Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 151 U. Pa. 
L. Rev. 1003 (2003). 
187 See generally THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN THE 20TH CENTURY: LATE LESSONS 
FROM EARLY WARNINGS (Poul Harremoës et al. eds., 2002) [hereinafter THE PRECAUTIONARY 
PRINCIPLE] (providing an overview of the precautionary principle and its application to real world 
problems, including DDT, GMOs, and global warming). 
188 See Morel et al., supra note 150, at 184-85, 192-202 (proposing option theory as an analytical 
framework for the precautionary principle and applying that framework to the issue of commercializing 
Bt corn); Wesseler, supra note 150, at 215-18 (discussing pest resistance as an irreversible cost of 
transgenic crops). For information about irreversibility more broadly, see Kenneth J. Arrow & Anthony 
C. Fischer, Environmental Preservation, Uncertainty and Irreversibility, 88 Q.J. ECON. 312, 313-14 (1974), 
which discusses the costs of irreversible harm to the environment; Scott Farrow, Using Risk 
Assessment, Benefit-Cost Analysis, and Real Options to Implement a Precautionary Principle, 24 RISK 
ANALYSIS 727, 728 (2004), which applies real-options analysis to public policy and the precautionary 
principle; and Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversibility, 9 LAW, PROBABILITY, & RISK 227, 227 (2010), which 
discusses irreversibility as an element of social problems. 
189 See Grossman, supra note 6, at 35-36 (noting that early European legislation was triggered 
by the perceived risk of GMOs as biotechnologies that posed risks to the environment); see also 
Anthony C. Fisher, Uncertainty, Irreversibility, and the Timing of Climate Policy 9 (Oct. 2001), 
http://stephenschneider.stanford.edu/Publications/PDF_Papers/timingFfisher.pdf [https://perma.cc
/B49V-L97M] (describing the option value of postponing decisions that could have potentially 
irreversible effects on the environment). 
190 Grossman, supra note 6, at 36. 
191 See Caroline E. Foster, Science and the Precautionary Principle in International Courts and 
Tribunals: Expert Evidence, Burden of Proof and Finality 19-20 (2013) (describing the history of 
the precautionary principles and its flourishing in international agreements since the early 1980s); 
Grossman, supra note 6, at 35 (“The precautionary principle . . . has become part of international 
law, particularly in measures that protect the environment”). 
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recognition to the principle, suggesting that “where potential adverse effects 
are not fully understood, the activities should not proceed.”192 The 1992 Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development asserts, “In order to protect the 
environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States 
according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible 
damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing 
cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.”193 The widely 
publicized Wingspread Declaration, from a meeting of environmentalists in 1998, 
goes further still: “When an activity raises threats of harm to human health or the 
environment, precautionary measures should be taken even if some cause-and-
effect relationships are not established scientifically. In this context the proponent 
of an activity, rather than the public, should bear the burden of proof.”194 
In its various forms, the precautionary principle has been subject to a 
great deal of analysis, some of it quite skeptical195 and some of it highly 
supportive.196 A central question involves the appropriate approach to “worst-
case” thinking. This is not the place for a full analysis, which would require 
investigation of some complex issues in decision theory,197 but three points 
seem clear (bracketing hard questions about quantification). First, if a product 
or activity has modest or no benefits, the argument for taking precautions is 
 
192 G.A. Res. 37/7, annex, World Charter for Nature (Oct. 28, 1982). 
193  U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/5/Rev.1, princ. 15 (June 13, 1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration], 
reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 876, 879. 
194 See Lessons from Wingspread, in PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH & THE ENVIRONMENT: 
IMPLEMENTING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE, app. A at 353-54 (Carolyn Raffensperger & 
Joel A. Tickner eds., 1999) (quoting the Wingspread Statement on the Precautionary Principle). 
The Wingspread Declaration was issued by a group of international scientists, government officials, 
lawyers, labor activist, and grassroots environmental activists following a meeting at Wingspread in 
Racine, Wisconsin to discuss the precautionary principle. See id. at 349. 
195 See INDUR M. GOKLANY, THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL RISK ASSESSMENT 7 (2001) (observing that a “one-sided application of the 
precautionary principle itself provides no guidance . . . in situations where an action . . . could 
simultaneously lead to uncertain benefits and uncertain harms (internal citation omitted)); CASS R. 
SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 14 (2005) (concluding that 
“the Precautionary Principle in its strongest forms is that it is incoherent” because “it purports to 
give guidance, but it fails to do so”). 
196 See THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE, supra note 187, at 1 (collecting the “histories of a 
selection of hazards” and how the precautionary principle was applied to them to “try[] to reduce 
current and future risks”); Nabil I. Al-Najjar, A Bayesian Framework for the Precautionary Principle, 
44 J. LEGAL STUD. S337, S361 (2016) (concluding that the precautionary principle is a means of 
correcting human and societal biases); see also Foster, supra note 191, at 20 (arguing that the precautionary 
principle has allowed “states to take action in response to the early warnings signs of [serious 
environmental] threats”). 
197 For an especially good discussion of this point, see generally Al-Najjar, supra note 196. Also 
valuable is DANIEL STEEL, PHILOSOPHY AND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE: SCIENCE, 
EVIDENCE, AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (2014). 
1090 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 165: 1043 
far stronger than if the benefits are significant. Second, if a product or activity 
creates a trivially small risk (taking account of both the probability and the 
magnitude of a bad outcome), then the product or activity should not be 
banned or regulated (including through labels) if it promises significant 
benefits. Third: if a product creates a small (but not trivial) risk of catastrophe, 
there is a strong argument for banning or regulating it (including through 
labels) if the benefits are very modest and so do not justify running that risk. 
Some of the most difficult cases arise when (1) a product or activity has 
significant benefits and (2) (a) the probability of a bad outcome is difficult or 
impossible to specify (creating a situation of “uncertainty,” rather than risk198), 
and (b) the bad outcome is catastrophic or (c) the harms associated with the bad 
outcome cannot be identified (creating a situation of “ignorance”199). In such 
difficult cases, it is not simple to balance the two sides of the ledger, and there 
is a real argument for eliminating the worst-case scenario.200 
Let us bracket the most complicated questions here and simply note that 
in this light, a precautionary argument for labeling GM foods (or otherwise 
for regulating them) depends in large part201 on answers to questions of fact. 
Is this a difficult case or an easy one? The answer turns largely on two further 
questions. Do such foods promise modest benefits, or instead large ones? With 
 
198 See FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT 19-20 (Midway Reprint ed., 
Univ. of Chi. Press 1985) (1921) (distinguishing measurable uncertainties, or “‘risk’ proper,” from 
unknowable uncertainties, called uncertainty); Paul Davidson, Is Probability Theory Relevant for 
Uncertainty? A Post Keynesian Perspective, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 129, 129-31 (1991) (describing the difference 
between true uncertainty and risk); Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversible and Catastrophic, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 
841, 848 (2006) (noting that for risk, “probabilities can be assigned to various outcomes,” while for 
uncertainty, “no such probabilities can be assigned”). For a technical treatment of the possible 
rationality of maximin, see generally Kenneth J. Arrow & Leonid Hurwicz, An Optimality Criterion for 
Decision-Making Under Ignorance, in UNCERTAINTY AND EXPECTATIONS IN ECONOMICS: ESSAYS IN 
HONOUR OF G.L.S. SHACKLE 1 (C.F. Carter & J.L. Ford eds., 1972). For a nontechnical overview, see 
JON ELSTER, EXPLAINING TECHNICAL CHANGE app. 1 at 185-207 (1983). 
199 See THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE, supra note 187, at 217 tbl.17.1 (defining ignorance as 
“‘[u]nknown’ impacts and therefore ‘unknown’ probabilities”). 
200 For a discussion of maximin, see JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 152-57 (1971). For 
information about complications in “[a]cting as if the worst will happen,” see ELSTER, supra note 198, 
at app. 1. at 203-04. See also Adrian Vermeule, Rationally Arbitrary Decisions in Administrative Law, 44 
J. LEGAL STUD. S475, S478 (2015) (“[I]n the face of uncertainty a rational decision maker may set 
the α-value—the parameter that captures pessimism or optimism—anywhere within a range defined 
by the worst-case and best-case scenarios . . . .”). Relevant discussion can also be found in Martin 
L. Weitzman, Fat-Tailed Uncertainty in the Economics of Catastrophic Climate Change, 5 REV. ENVTL. 
ECON. & POL’Y 275, 276 (2011), which discusses “structural uncertainties in the economics of 
extreme climate change.” 
201 It also depends partly on concepts. For a discussion on some of the these issues, see 
ELSTER, supra note 198, at app. 1; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WORST-CASE SCENARIOS 127-28 (2007), 
which argues that regulation to avoid worst-case scenarios can sometimes result in “worst-case 
scenarios of [their] own”; and Vermeule, supra note 200, at S481, which discusses the “conceptual 
mistakes about what counts as rational decision making under uncertainty.” 
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respect to harm, are we speaking of risk, uncertainty, or ignorance? The 
scientific consensus appears to be risk—and that the underlying danger is very 
low.202 The consensus may or may not prove correct, but however important, 
its correctness raises no interesting conceptual questions for our purposes. At 
the same time, it is true that those who favor a kind of epistemic humility, 
even for scientific consensus, will be drawn to a precautionary approach. 
It should be added that if GM foods really do create a potentially 
catastrophic risk, and if a sensible version of the precautionary principle is 
therefore triggered, GM labels are hardly an obvious response. In the 
abstract, they seem far too weak and modest. Indeed, GM labels might do no 
good at all. The counterargument is that they might be able to diminish the 
risk, on certain assumptions about the likely consumer response, and so might 
count as one reasonable step. I have raised a question about whether the 
science justifies invocation of precautionary thinking here, but if it does, 
labeling might be a justified, if partial, response. 
A distinctive argument, ventured by Nassim Nicholas Taleb et al., is that 
GM crops pose a “ruin” problem, involving a low probability of catastrophically 
high costs.203 Taleb et al. contend that for such problems, it is best to take strong 
precautions—in this case, placing “severe limits” on GM food.204 The discussion 
has some technical features, but let us suppose that it is correct. If so, the 
question is whether GM crops really do create ruin problems. Perhaps they do, 
but it is certainly possible to read the most recent science to suggest that they 
do not, and if the probability of catastrophic harm is vanishingly low 
(essentially zero), rather than merely very low, we can fairly ask whether Taleb 
et al.’s argument applies. 
B. Precautions and Democracy 
On one view, the precautionary principle is not only, or even fundamentally, 
about irreversibility, catastrophe, and decision theory.205 It has an insistently 
democratic foundation. Its goal is to assert popular control over risks that concern 
the public.206 It is about values, not facts. If members of the public are concerned 
about GMOs, nuclear power, or nanotechnology, then the precautionary 
 
202 See supra notes 106–21 and accompanying text. 
203 See Taleb et al., supra note 119, at 10 (arguing that by “manipulat[ing] large sets of 
interdependent factors at the same time,” GMOs have the potential to upset the entire food system). 
204 Id. at 1. 
205 See supra note 187. 
206 See, e.g., David Gee & Morris Greenberg, Asbestos: From ‘Magic’ to Malevolent Mineral, in 
THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE, supra note 187, at 47, 59 (discussing how regulation of asbestos 
resulted, in large part, from public pressure for the government to regulate). 
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principle provides them with a space for them to assert those concerns. It ensures 
democratic legitimation of the process of risk regulation. 
For those who embrace the precautionary principle on this ground, efforts 
to speak of costs and benefits will fall on deaf ears. And for those who believe 
that in this domain or others, scientists are in the grip of powerful private 
interests, and that the “system is rigged,” a precautionary approach will seem 
especially appealing—not least for democratic reasons.207 If the science is 
compromised, and hence unreliable, it should hardly be decisive. For those 
who believe that popular concerns often turn out to be justified even if 
scientists discount them, the democratic justification for the precautionary 
principle might even turn out to be appealing on epistemic grounds. 
No abstract argument can rule out the possibility that scientists are 
mistaken or that they have been compromised. It is correct to emphasize that 
a scientific consensus in favor of safety208 can be wrong; the same is the case 
for a scientific consensus in favor of danger.209 For those who favor the 
precautionary principle on democratic grounds—and believe that popular 
concerns about GM foods are a legitimate basis for invocation of the 
principle—the arguments offered here cannot be decisive. The only response 
is that some form of welfarism, embodied in the executive branch’s self-
conscious efforts to cataloge the human consequences of regulation,210 should 
not be trumped by baseless fear—and that cost–benefit analysis, understood 
as a form of applied welfarism,211 should not be abandoned merely because 
people are needlessly worried. 
CONCLUSION 
My goals in this Article have been twofold. First, I have attempted to 
make progress in understanding the distinctive challenges, both conceptual 
and empirical, that agencies face in cataloguing the costs and (especially) the 
benefits of mandatory labels, and in demonstrating that the benefits of such 
 
207 As one commentator noted in response to an argument against mandatory labels, “So God 
is wrong and Monsanto is right?” 
208 See supra subsection II.A.3. 
209 See ALLAN MAZUR, TRUE WARNINGS AND FALSE ALARMS: EVALUATING FEARS 
ABOUT THE HEALTH RISKS OF TECHNOLOGY, 1948–1971, at 4 (2004) (“No scientific judgment is 
absolute. Objections or qualifications can be raised for every risk assessment.”). 
210 See ADLER, supra note 65, at 165-66 (discussing the perspective that “government should 
orient policy around producing individual well-being” while also acknowledging that there exist 
different approaches to measuring well-being). 
211 See MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT 
ANALYSIS 12 (2006) (explaining cost–benefit analysis in terms of welfare economics, and stating that 
“welfare economics assumes that a person is better off when his preferences are respected”); 
SUNSTEIN, supra note 71, at 145-47 (describing cost–benefit analysis in the context of the risk of 
human death). 
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labels justify the costs. Second, I have tried to show that those challenges are 
especially acute in the context of labels for GM foods. 
In the abstract, the argument for labeling GM food seems appealing, perhaps 
even irresistible. Many people are concerned about what they see as the 
associated risks of GM food.212 It might appear obvious that they should have a 
right to know what they are eating. Partly in response to these claims, there has 
been a growing movement in favor of mandatory labeling; the movement has 
now resulted in federal legislation.213 That legislation requires implementing 
regulations from the USDA,214 and hence some kind of cost–benefit analysis.215 
I have suggested that it will not be easy for the USDA to show that the 
benefits of GM labels justify the costs. To the extent that the health risks are 
nonexistent,216 and the environmental risks are highly speculative,217 the 
benefits might fail to support regulatory action, even if the costs are relatively 
low. To be sure, consumers do appear to support labeling, at least in surveys.218 
But in their actual behavior, most consumers do not show much evidence that 
they care, as reflected in the fact that the countless foods without a “GM free” 
label have not exactly been losing market shares. 
Moreover, consumer concerns about GM foods appear to be rooted in some 
combination of baseless fears of health risks and generalized disgust219—hardly 
a sufficient basis for mandatory labels. There is also a risk that GM labels 
will, for a significant part of the population, end up producing a misleading 
signal, to the effect that the government believes that GM foods impose 
significant health risks.220 
Some regulatory initiatives are justified as precautions in the face of either 
risk or uncertainty. There are good reasons to consider regulation of products 
that impose a small risk of imposing irreversible or catastrophic harm, and if the 
risk cannot be quantified, it might make sense to eliminate the worst-case 
scenarios.221 On one view of the science, precautions are justified against GM 
food because of the environmental risks, and those precautions might include 
labels (and possibly more). The best response is that the scientific consensus 
 
212 See supra notes 6–7. 
213 See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
214 See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
215 See supra note 11. 
216 See supra subsection II.A.3. 
217 See supra subsection II.A.4. 
218 See supra text accompanying note 125. 
219 See supra text accompanying notes 124, 133–39. 
220 See supra text accompanying notes 182–85. 
221 See supra notes 203–05 and accompanying text. 
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does not justify that conclusion. If so, the argument for a precautionary approach 
is difficult to defend—at least if GM food promises significant benefits.222 
In these circumstances, the USDA will face difficulty in demonstrating 
that the benefits of implementing regulations justify their costs. To be sure, 
the law requires labels,223 and hence the agency’s inability to make such a 
demonstration will not prevent implementing regulations from being issued. 
But within the executive branch, there will be a substantial effort to explore 
costs and benefits, and to show, if at all possible, that the benefits provide a 
sufficient justification. The USDA’s best (or least bad) option may be to 
emphasize that the costs of labels are quite low and to use breakeven analysis, 
either invoking consumers’ desire to have labels or pointing to the existence 
of potentially serious or even catastrophic environmental risks that cannot be 
ruled out of bounds. If the per person cost is very low—say, $2 per year—then 
a breakeven analysis would not be implausible.224 
My focus throughout has been on mandatory labels for GM foods, but 
my real topic has been far broader. In numerous contexts, Congress requires 
or authorizes federal agencies to impose disclosure requirements.225 In all 
those contexts, executive agencies are required, by executive order, to cataloge 
the benefits and costs of disclosure requirements, and to demonstrate that the 
benefits justify the costs.226 As we have seen, agencies face persistent challenges 
in projecting benefits, and they use four different approaches, including a 
refusal to do so on the ground that quantification is not feasible; breakeven 
 
222 See, e.g., Graham Brookes & Peter Barfoot, GM Crops: The Global Economic and 
Environmental Impact—The First Nine Years 1996–2004, 8 AGBIOFORUM 187, 194-95 (2005) 
(quantifying the economic and environmental benefits associated with GM technology and finding 
“substantial economic benefits at the farm level,” “less pesticide use,” and “a significant contribution 
to reducing greenhouse gas emissions”); K.-H. Engel et al., Current and Future Benefits from the Use 
of GM Technology in Food Production, 127 TOXICOLOGY LETTERS 329, 330-32 (2002) (listing 
beneficial applications of GM technology, including improving plants’ herbicide tolerance, insect 
resistance, and nutritional properties); Randall Lutter & Katherine Tucker, Unacknowledged Health 
Benefits of Genetically Modified Food: Salmon and Heart Disease Deaths, 5 AGBIOFORUM 59, 59 (2002) 
(proposing that “[l]ower production costs [of GM salmon] would lower prices, increase salmon 
consumption, and boost intake” of heart-healthy nutrients). 
223 See supra text accompanying note 9. 
224 See supra text accompanying notes 167–70. 
225 For a detailed catalogue and a highly skeptical account, see BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, 
supra note 44. 
226 See supra notes 1–2 and 11. Note that current executive orders do not apply to the so-called 
“independent” agencies, though those agencies sometimes produce cost–benefit analyses under 
statutory compulsion or on their own. See, e.g., Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1149-50 (D.C. 
Cir. 2011) (finding that the SEC acted arbitrarily and capriciously in that it “inconsistently and 
opportunistically framed the costs and benefits of the rule” and “failed adequately to quantify the 
certain costs”). Recall once more that whenever the law requires agencies to proceed, they must do 
so even if benefits do not justify costs; the requirements in relevant executive orders are imposed 
“to the extent permitted by law.” See supra note 15. 
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analysis; projection of end-states, such as economic savings or health outcomes; 
and estimates of willingness-to-pay for the relevant information. 
Each of these approaches raises serious questions and runs into strong 
objections. In principle, the right question involves willingness-to-pay227; but in 
practice, agencies face formidable problems in trying to answer that question. If 
answers are unavailable, a breakeven analysis is the very least that should be 
required, and it is sometimes the most that agencies can do. If it is accompanied 
by some account of potential outcomes, acknowledging uncertainties, a 
breakeven analysis will often show that mandatory disclosure is justified on 
welfare grounds—and often that it is not. 
 
227 This is subject to qualifications. See supra note 53. 
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